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ON CONCAVITY OF THE MONOPOLIST’S PROBLEM FACING CONSUMERS
WITH NONLINEAR PRICE PREFERENCES∗
ROBERT J. MCCANN† AND KELVIN SHUANGJIAN ZHANG‡
Abstract. A monopolist wishes to maximize her profits by finding an optimal price policy. After she
announces a menu of products and prices, each agent x will choose to buy that product y(x) which
maximizes his own utility, if positive. The principal’s profits are the sum of the net earnings produced
by each product sold. These are determined by the costs of production and the distribution of products
sold, which in turn are based on the distribution of anonymous agents and the choices they make in
response to the principal’s price menu. In this paper, we provide a necessary and sufficient condition
for the convexity or concavity of the principal’s (bilevel) optimization problem, assuming each agent’s
disutility is a strictly increasing but not necessarily affine (i.e. quasilinear) function of the price paid.
Concavity when present, makes the problem more amenable to computational and theoretical analysis;
it is key to obtaining uniqueness and stability results for the principal’s strategy in particular. Even
in the quasilinear case, our analysis goes beyond previous work by addressing convexity as well as
concavity, by establishing conditions which are not only sufficient but necessary, and by requiring
fewer hypotheses on the agents’ preferences.
1. Introduction
As one of the central problems in microeconomic theory, the principal-agent framework characterizes
the type of non-competitive decision-making problems which involve aligning incentives so that one
set of parties (the agents) finds it beneficial to act in the interests of another (the principal) despite
holding private information. It arises in a variety of different contexts. Besides nonlinear pricing
[1, 26, 39, 42], economists also use this framework to model many different types of transactions,
including tax policy [12, 23, 31], contract theory [29], regulation of monopolies [3], product line design
[33], labour market signaling [38], public utilities [30], and mechanism design [21, 23, 24, 27, 41]. Many
of these share the same mathematical model. In this paper, we use nonlinear pricing to motivate the
discussion, in spite of the fact that our conclusions may be equally pertinent to many other areas of
application.
Consider the problem of a monopolist who wants to maximize her profits by selecting the dependence
of the price v(y) on each type y ∈ cl(Y ) of product sold. An agent of type x ∈ X will choose to buy
that product which maximizes his benefit
(1.1) u(x) := max
y∈cl(Y )
G(x, y, v(y))
where (x, y, z) ∈ X× cl(Y )×R 7−→ G(x, y, z) ∈ R, is the given direct utility function for agent type x
to choose product type y at price z, and X,Y are open and bounded subsets in Rm and Rn (m ≥ n),
∗The authors are grateful to Guillaume Carlier, Ivar Ekeland, Alfred Galichon, and Xianwen Shi for stimulating conver-
sations, and to Georg No¨ldeke and Larry Samuelson for sharing their work with us in preprint form. The first author’s
research was supported in part by NSERC grant 217006-08 and -15, by a Simons Foundation Fellowship, and by a two-
week residency at the Institut Mittag-Leffler. This project was initiated during the Fall of 2013 when both authors were
in residence at the Mathematical Sciences Reseach Institute in Berkeley CA, under a program supported by National
Science Foundation Grant No. 0932078 000, and progressed at the Fall 2014 program of the Fields Institute for the
Mathematical Sciences. c©September 5, 2017.
†Department of Mathematics, University of Toronto, Toronto, Ontario, Canada, M5S 2E4 mccann@math.toronto.edu.
‡Department of Mathematics, University of Toronto, Toronto, Ontario, Canada, M5S 2E4 szhang@math.toronto.edu.
1
respectively, with closures cl(X) and cl(Y ). After agents, whose distribution dµ(x) is known to the
monopolist, have chosen their favorite items to buy, the monopolist calculates her profit to be given
by the functional
(1.2) Π(v, y) :=
∫
X
pi(x, y(x), v(y(x)))dµ(x),
where y(x) denotes the product type y which agent type x chooses to buy (and which maximizes (1.1)),
v(y(x)) denotes the selling price of type y(x) and pi ∈ C0(cl(X × Y )×R) denotes the principal’s net
profit of selling product type y ∈ cl(Y ) to agent type x ∈ X at price z ∈ R. The monopolist wants to
maximize her net profit among all lower semicontinuous pricing policies. Individual agents accept to
contract only if the benefits they earn are no less than their outside option; we model this by assuming
the existence of a distinguished point y∅ ∈ cl(Y ) which represents the outside option, and whose price
cannot exceed some fixed value z∅ ∈ R beyond the monopolist’s control. This removes any incentive
for the monopolist to raise the prices of other options too high. (We can choose normalizations such
as pi(x, y∅, z∅) = 0 = G(x, y∅, z∅) and (y∅, z∅) = (0, 0), or not, as we wish.)
The following is a table of notation:
Table 1. Notation
Mathematical
Expression
Economic Meaning
x agent type
y product type
X ⊂ Rm (open, bounded) domain of agent types
cl(Y ) ⊂ Rn domain of product types, closure of Y
v(y) selling price of product type y
v(y∅) ≤ z∅ price normalization of the outside option y∅ ∈ cl(Y )
u(x) indirect utility of agent type x
domDu points in X where u is differentiable
G(x, y, z) direct utility of buying product y at price z for agent x
H(x, y, u) price at which y brings x utility u, so that H(x, y,G(x, y, z)) = z
pi(x, y, z) the principal’s profit for selling product y to agent x at price z
dµ(x) Borel probability measure giving the distribution of agent types on X
µ ≪ Lm µ vanishes on each subset of Rm having zero Lebesgue volume Lm
Π(v, y) monopolist’s profit facing agents’ responses y(·) to her chosen price policy v(·)
Π(u) monopolist’s profit, viewed instead as a function of agents’ indirect utilities u(·)
For the quasilinear case, where the utility G(x, y, z) depends linearly on its third variable, and net
profit pi(x, y, z) = z− a(y) represents difference of selling price z and manufacturing cost a of product
type y, theories of existence [4, 34, 5, 24], uniqueness [6, 9, 26, 33] and robustness [4, 9] have been well
studied. The equivalence of concavity to the corresponding non-negative cross-curvature condition
revealed by Figalli-Kim-McCann [9] directly inspires our work. In addition to the quaslinearity of
G(x, y, z) = b(x, y) − z essential to their model, they require additional restrictions such as m = n
and b ∈ C4(cl(X × Y )) which are not economically motivated and which we shall relax or remove.
Moreover, our results allow for the monopolist’s profit pi to depend in a general way both on monetary
transfers and on the agents’ types x, revealed after contracting. Such dependence plays an important
role in applications such as insurance marketing.
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For a particular case, where cl(X) = cl(Y ) = [0,∞)n, G(x, y, z) = 〈x, y〉 − z, a(y) = 〈y, y〉/2,
and (y∅, z∅) = (0, 0), Rochet and Chone´ [33] not only obtained existence results but also partially
characterized optimal solutions and interpreted them economically. Here 〈 , 〉 denotes the Euclidean
inner product.
More generally, Carlier [5] proved existence for the general quasilinear utility, where X is a bounded
open convex subset in Rm with C1 boundary, cl(Y ) = [0,∞)n, G(x, y, z) = b(x, y)− z and the manu-
facturing cost a is linear; see also Monteiro and Page [24].
The generalization of quasilinear to nonlinear preferences has many potential applications. For ex-
ample, the benefit function G(x, y, v(y)) = b(x, y)−v2(y) models agents who are more sensitive to high
prices, while G(x, y, v(y)) = b(x, y) − v
1
2 (y) models agents who are less sensitive to high prices. Very
few results are known for such nonlinearities, due to the complications which they entail. However,
we shall eventually show that under certain conditions the concavity or convexity of G and pi (or their
derivatives) with respect to v tends to be reflected by concavity or convexity of Π, not with respect
to v or y, but rather with respect to the agents indirect utility u, in terms of which the principal’s
maximization is reformulated below.
The generalized existence problem was mentioned as a conjecture by Basov [4, Chapter 8]. Recently,
No¨ldeke and Samuelson [28] provided a general existence result for cl(X), cl(Y ) being compact and
the utility G being decreasing with respect to its third variable, by implementing a duality argument
based on Galois Connections. Initially independently of [28], Zhang [43] found another general ex-
istence result for the principal-agent framework where the utility function is decreasing with respect
to its third variable but on potentially unbounded domains. In Zhang’s work, G-convexity plays a
crucial role.
In 2013, Trudinger’s lecture at the optimal transport program at MSRI inspired us to try general-
izing Figalli-Kim-McCann [9] to the non-quasilinear case. With the tools developed by Trudinger [40]
and others [2, 37], we are able to provide convexity and concavity theorems for general utility and net
profit functions. For an application of G-convexity to geometric optics, see [14].
Section 2 lists most of hypotheses we need in this paper. Section 3 introduces G-convexity, G-
subdifferentiability, and various equivalent forms of the principal’s program. Section 4 presents a
variety of necessary and sufficient conditions for concavity (and convexity) of the principal’s problem,
and the resulting uniqueness of her optimal strategy. Several examples are developed, based on an
analytic criterion for concavity, whose proof is deferred to section 5. Appendix A gives a differential
criterion for the crucial hypotheses — (G3) of the next section — clarifying its relation to that of
Figalli, Kim & McCann [9], and the Ma-Trudinger-Wang criteria for regularity of optimal maps [19]
which inspired it. In appendix B, we assume the monopolist’s utility does not depend on the agent’s
private information, which in certain circumstances allows us to provide a necessary and sufficient
condition for concavity of her profit functional.
2. Hypotheses
For notational convenience, we adopt the following technical hypotheses, inspired by those of
Trudinger [40] and Figalli-Kim-McCann [9]. Here we useGx =
(
∂G
∂x1
, ∂G
∂x2
, ..., ∂G
∂xm
)
, Gy =
(
∂G
∂y1
, ∂G
∂y2
, ..., ∂G
∂yn
)
,
Gz =
∂G
∂z
to denote derivatives with respect to x ∈ X ⊂ Rm , y ∈ Y ⊂ Rn, and z ∈ R, respectively.
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Also, for second partial derivatives, we adopt following notation
Gx,y =


∂2G
∂x1∂y1
∂2G
∂x1∂y2
... ∂
2G
∂x1∂yn
∂2G
∂x2∂y1
∂2G
∂x2∂y2
... ∂
2G
∂x2∂yn
...
...
. . .
...
∂2G
∂xm∂y1
∂2G
∂xm∂y2
... ∂
2G
∂xm∂yn

 ,
Gx,z =
(
∂2G
∂x1∂z
, ∂
2G
∂x2∂z
, ..., ∂
2G
∂xm∂z
)
.
We say G ∈ C1(cl(X × Y × Z)), if all the partial derivatives ∂G
∂x1
, ..., ∂G
∂xm
, ∂G
∂y1
, ..., ∂G
∂yn
, ∂G
∂z
ex-
ist and are continuous. Also, we say G ∈ C2(cl(X × Y × Z)), if all the partial derivatives up to
second order( i.e. ∂
2G
∂α∂β
, where α, β = x1, ..., xm, y1, ..., yn, z) exist and are continuous. Any bijective
continuous function whose inverse is also continuous, is called a homeomorphism (a.k.a. bicontinuous).
The following hypotheses will be relevant: (G1)–(G3) represent partial analogs of the twist, domain
convexity, and non-negative cross-curvature hypotheses from the quasilinear setting [9] [18]; (G4)
encodes a form of the desirability of money to each agent, while (G5) quantifies the assertion that
the maximum price z¯ is high enough that no agent prefers paying it for any product y to the outside
option.
(G0) G ∈ C1(cl(X × Y × Z)), where X ⊂ Rm, Y ⊂ Rn are open and bounded and Z = (z, z¯) with
−∞ < z < z¯ ≤ +∞.
(G1) For each x ∈ X, the map (y, z) ∈ cl(Y × Z) 7−→ (Gx, G)(x, y, z) is a homeomorphism onto its
range;
(G2) its range (cl(Y × Z))x := (Gx, G)(x, cl(Y × Z)) ⊂ R
m+1 is convex.
For each x0 ∈ X and (y0, z0), (y1, z1) ∈ cl(Y × Z), define (yt, zt) ∈ cl(Y × Z) such that the
following equation holds:
(2.1) (Gx, G)(x0, yt, zt) = (1− t)(Gx, G)(x0, y0, z0) + t(Gx, G)(x0, y1, z1), for each t ∈ [0, 1].
By (G1) and (G2), (yt, zt) is uniquely determined by (2.1). We call t ∈ [0, 1] 7−→ (x0, yt, zt)
the G-segment connecting (x0, y0, z0) and (x0, y1, z1).
(G3) For each x, x0 ∈ X, assume t ∈ [0, 1] 7−→ G(x, yt, zt) is convex along all G-segments (2.1).
(G4) For each (x, y, z) ∈ X × cl(Y )× cl(Z), assume Gz(x, y, z) < 0.
(G5) pi ∈ C0(cl(X × Y ×Z)) and u∅(x) := G(x, y∅, z∅) for some fixed (y∅, z∅) ∈ cl(Y ×Z) satisfying
G(x, y, z¯) := lim
z→z¯
G(x, y, z) ≤ G(x, y∅, z∅) for all (x, y) ∈ X × cl(Y ).
When z¯ = +∞ assume this inequality is strict, and moreover that z sufficiently large implies
G(x, y, z) < G(x, y∅, z∅) for all (x, y) ∈ X × cl(Y ).
For each u ∈ R, (G4) allows us to define H(x, y, u) := z if G(x, y, z) = u, i.e. H(x, y, ·) =
G−1(x, y, ·).
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3. Principal’s program, G-convexity, G-subdifferentiability
In this section, we will introduce the principal’s program and reformulate it in the language of
G-convexity and G-subdifferentiability. The purpose of this section is to fix terminology and prepare
the preliminaries for the main results of the next section.
In economic models, incentive compatibility is needed to ensure that all the agents report their
preferences truthfully. According to the revelation principle, this costs no generality. Decisions made
by monopolist according to the information collected from agents then lead to the expected market
reaction (as in [5, 33]). Individual rationality is required to ensure full participation, so that each
agent will choose to play, possibly by accepting the outside option.
Definition 3.1 (Incentive compatible and individually rational). A measurable map x ∈ X 7−→
(y(x), z(x)) ∈ cl(Y × Z) of agents to (product, price) pairs is called incentive compatible if and only
if G(x, y(x), z(x)) ≥ G(x, y(x′), z(x′)) for all (x, x′) ∈ X. Such a map offers agent x no incentive to
pretend to be x′. It is called individually rational if and only if G(x, y(x), z(x)) ≥ G(x, y∅, z∅) for all
x ∈ X, meaning no individual x strictly prefers the outside option to his assignment (y(x), z(x)).
Given pi and (y∅, z∅) from (G5), the principal’s program can be described as follows:
(3.1) (P0)


supΠ(v, y) =
∫
X
pi(x, y(x), v(y(x)))dµ(x) among
x ∈ X 7−→ (y(x), v(y(x))) incentive compatible, individually rational,
and v : cl(Y ) −→ cl(Z) lower semicontinuous with v(y∅) ≤ z∅.
In this section we’ll also see that incentive compatibility is conveniently encoded via the G-convexity
defined below of the agents’ indirect utility u. We’ll then reformulate the principal’s program using u
as a proxy for the prices v controlled by the principal, thus generalizing Carlier’s approach [5] to the
non-quasilinear setting. Moreover, the agent’s indirect utility u and product selling price v are G-dual
to each other in the sense of [40].
Definition 3.2 (G-convexity). A function u ∈ C0(X) is called G-convex if for each x0 ∈ X, there exists
y0 ∈ cl(Y ), and z0 ∈ cl(Z) such that u(x0) = G(x0, y0, z0), and u(x) ≥ G(x, y0, z0), for all x ∈ X.
From the definition, we know if u is a G-convex function, for any x ∈ X where u happens to be
differentiable, denoted x ∈ domDu, there exists y ∈ cl(Y ) and z ∈ cl(Z) such that
(3.2) u(x) = G(x, y, z), Du(x) = DxG(x, y, z).
Conversely, when (3.2) holds, one can identify (y, z) ∈ cl(Y ×Z) in terms of u(x) and Du(x), according
to Condition (G1). We denote it as y¯G(x, u(x),Du(x)) := (yG, zG)(x, u(x),Du(x)), and drop the
subscript G when it is clear from context. Under our hypotheses, y¯G is a continuous function, at
least in the region where u ≥ u∅. It will often prove convenient to augment the types x and y with
an extra real variable; here and later we use the notation x¯ ∈ Rm+1 and y¯ ∈ Rn+1 to signify this
augmentation. In addition, the set X \ domDu has Lebesgue measure zero, which will be shown in
the proof of Theorem 3.8.
While G-convexity acts as a generalized notion of convexity, the G-subdifferentiability defined below
generalizes the concept of differentiability/subdifferentiability.
Definition 3.3 (G-subdifferentiability). The G-subdifferential of a function u(x) is defined by
∂Gu(x) := {y ∈ cl(Y ) | u(x′) ≥ G(x′, y,H(x, y, u(x))), for all x′ ∈ X}.
A function u is said to be G-subdifferentiable at x if and only if ∂Gu(x) 6= ∅.
In [40], this point-to-set map ∂Gu is also called G-normal mapping. For more properties related to
G-convexity, see [40].
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Lemma 3.4 shows an equivalent relationship between G-convexity and G-subdifferentiability, a
special case of which is that a function is convex if and only if it is subdifferentiable on (the interior
of) its domain.
Lemma 3.4 (G-subdifferentiability characterizes G-convexity). A function u : X −→ R is G-convex
if and only if it is G-subdifferentiable everywhere.
Proof. Assume u is G-convex, want to show u is G-subdifferentiable everywhere, i.e., need to prove
∂Gu(x0) 6= ∅ for all x0 ∈ X.
Since u isG-convex, by definition, for each x0, there exists y0, z0, such that u(x0) = G(x0, y0, z0), and
for all x ∈ X,u(x) ≥ G(x, y0, z0) = G(x, y0,H(x0, y0, u(x0))). By the definition ofG-subdifferentiability,
y0 ∈ ∂
Gu(x0), i.e. ∂
Gu(x0) 6= ∅.
On the other hand, assume y is G-subdifferentiable everywhere, then for each x0 ∈ X, there exists
y0 ∈ ∂
Gu(x0). Set z0 := H(x0, y0, u(x0)) so that u(x0) = G(x0, y0, z0).
Since y0 ∈ ∂
Gu(x0), we have u(x) ≥ G(x, y0,H(x0, y0, u(x0))) = G(x, y0, z0) for all x ∈ X. By
definition, u is G-convex. 
We now show each G-convex function defined in Definition 3.2 can be achieved by some price menu
v, and conversely each price menu yields a G-convex indirect utility [40]. We require either (G5) or
(3.3), which asserts all agents are repelled by the maximum price, and insensitive to which contract
they receive at that price.
Proposition 3.5 (Duality between prices and indirect utilities). Assume (G0) and (G4). (a) If
(3.3) G(x, y, z¯) := lim
z→z¯
G(x, y, z) = inf
(y˜,z˜)∈cl(Y×Z)
G(x, y˜, z˜) ∀(x, y) ∈ X × cl(Y ),
then a function u ∈ C0(X) is G-convex if and only if there exist a lower semicontinuous v : cl(Y ) −→
cl(Z) such that u(x) = maxy∈cl(Y )G(x, y, v(y)). (b) If instead of (3.3) we assume (G5), then u∅ ≤
u ∈ C0(X) is G-convex if and only if there exists a lower semicontinuous function v : cl(Y ) −→ cl(Z)
with v(y∅) ≤ z∅ such that u(x) = maxy∈cl(Y )G(x, y, v(y)).
Proof. 1. Suppose u is G-convex. Then for any agent type x0 ∈ X, there exists a product and price
(y0, z0) ∈ cl(Y × Z), such that u(x0) = G(x0, y0, z0) and u(x) ≥ G(x, y0, z0), for all x ∈ X.
Let A := ∪x∈X∂
Gu(x) denote the corresponding set of products. For y0 ∈ A, define v(y0) = z0,
where z0 ∈ cl(Z) and x0 ∈ X satisfy u(x0) = G(x0, y0, z0) and u(x) ≥ G(x, y0, z0) for all x ∈ X. We
shall shortly show this makes v : A −→ cl(Z) (i) well-defined and (ii) lower semicontinuous. Taking
(i) for granted, our construction yields
(3.4) u(x) = max
y∈A
G(x, y, v(y)) ∀x ∈ X.
(i) Now for y0 ∈ A, suppose there exist (x0, z0), (x1, z1) ∈ X× cl(Z) with z0 6= z1, such that u(xi) =
G(xi, y0, zi) and u(x) ≥ G(x, y0, zi) for all x ∈ X and i = 0, 1. Without loss of generality, assume
z0 < z1. By (G4), we know u(x1) = G(x1, y0, z1) < G(x1, y0, z0), contradicting u(x) ≥ G(x, y0, z0), for
all x ∈ X. Having shown v : A −→ cl(Z) is well-defined, we now show it is lower semicontinuous.
(ii) Suppose {yk} ⊂ A converges to y0 ∈ A and z∞ := lim
k→∞
v(yk) = lim inf
y→y0
v(y). We need to show
v(y0) ≤ z∞. Letting zk := v(yk) for each k, there exists xk ∈ X such that
(3.5) u(x) ≥ G(x, yk, zk) ∀x ∈ X and k = 0, 1, 2, . . . ,
with equality holding at x = xk. In case (b) we deduce z∞ <∞ from
G(xk, yk, zk) = u(xk) ≥ G(xk, y∅, z∅)
and (G5). Taking k →∞, (G0) (or (3.3) in case (a) when z∞ = +∞) implies
(3.6) u(x) ≥ G(x, y0, z∞) ∀x ∈ X.
Applying (G4) to G(x0, y0, z0) = u(x0) ≥ G(x0, y0, z∞) yields the desired semicontinuity: z0 ≤ z∞.
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(iii) We extend v from A to cl(Y ) by taking its lower semicontinuous hull; this does not change the
values of v on A, but satisfies v(y0) := z¯ on y0 /∈ cl(A). We now show this choice of price menu v
yields (1.1). Recall for each x ∈ X, there exists (y0, z0) ∈ cl(Y × Z) such that
u(x) = G(x, y0, z0) ≥ (u∅(x) := G(x, y∅, z∅) ≥) sup
y∈cl(Y )\cl(A)
G(x, y, v(y)),
in view of (3.3) (or (G5)), and the fact that v(y) = z¯ for each y outside cl(A). Thus to establish
(1.1), we need only show that (3.4) remains true when the domain of the maximum is enlarged from
A to cl(A). Since we have chosen the largest lower semicontinuous extension of v outside of A, each
y0 ∈ cl(A)\A is approximated by a sequence {yk} ⊂ A for which zk := v(yk) converges to z∞ := v(y0).
As before, (3.5) holds and implies (3.6), showing (3.4) indeed remains true when the domain of the
maximum is enlarged from A to cl(A), and establishing (1.1). Finally, if v(y∅) > z∅ in case (b) then
(G4) yields u(x) ≥ u∅(x) > G(x, y∅, v(y∅)), and we may redefine v(y∅) := z∅ without violating either
(1.1) or the lower semicontinuity of v.
2. Conversely, suppose there exist a lower semicontinuous function v : cl(Y ) −→ cl(Z), such that
u(x) = maxy∈cl(Y )G(x, y, v(y)). Then for any x0 ∈ X, there exists y0 ∈ cl(Y ), such that u(x0) =
G(x0, y0, v(y0)). Let z0 := v(y0), then u(x0) = G(x0, y0, z0), and for all x ∈ X, u(x) ≥ G(x, y0, z0).
By definition, u is G-convex. If v(y∅) ≤ z∅ then u(·) ≥ G(·, y∅, v(y∅)) ≥ u∅(·) by (1.1) and (G4). 
Remark 3.6 (Optimal agent strategies). Assume (G0) and (G4). When z¯ <∞, lower semicontinuity
of v : cl(Y ) −→ cl(Z) is enough to ensure the maximum (1.1) is attained. However, when z¯ = +∞
we can reach the same conclusion either by assuming the limit (3.3) converges uniformly with respect
to y ∈ cl(Y ), or else by assuming v(y∅) ≤ z∅ and (G5).
Proof. For any fixed x ∈ X let u(x) = sup
y∈cl(Y )
G(x, y, v(y)). We will show that the maximum is at-
tained. Since cl(Y ) is compact, suppose {yk} ⊂ cl(Y ) converges to y0 ∈ cl(Y ), z∞ := lim sup
k→∞
v(yk)
and u(x) = lim
k→∞
G(x, yk, v(yk)). By extracting subsequence of {yk} and relabelling, without loss of
generality, assume lim
k→∞
v(yk) = z∞.
1. If z∞ < z¯ then lower semicontinuity of v yields v(y0) ≤ z∞ < +∞. By (G4), one has
(3.7) G(x, y0, v(y0)) ≥ G(x, y0, z∞) = lim
k→∞
G(x, yk, v(yk)) = u(x) = sup
y∈cl(Y )
G(x, y, v(y)).
Therefore, the maximum is attained by y0.
2. If z∞ = z¯ then lim
k→∞
v(yk) = z¯ = +∞.
2.1. By assuming the limit (3.3) converges uniformly with respect to y ∈ cl(Y ), we have
inf
(y˜,z˜)∈cl(Y×Z)
G(x, y˜, z˜) = G(x, y0, z¯) = lim
k→∞
G(x, yk, v(yk)) = u(x) = sup
y∈cl(Y )
G(x, y, v(y)).
In this case, the maximum is attained by y0.
2.2. By assuming (G5), for sufficient large k, we have G(x, yk, v(yk)) < G(x, y∅, z∅). Taking k →∞,
by v(y∅) ≤ z∅ and (G4), one has
sup
y∈cl(Y )
G(x, y, v(y)) = u(x) = lim
k→∞
G(x, yk, v(yk)) ≤ G(x, y∅, z∅) ≤ G(x, y∅, v(y∅)).
Thus, the maximum is attained by y∅. 
Lemma 3.7 plays the role of bridge connecting incentive compatibility in the economic context with
G-convexity and G-subdifferentiability in mathematical analysis, generalizing the results of Rochet
[32] and Carlier [5].
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Lemma 3.7 (G-convex utilities characterize incentive compatibility). A measurable map x ∈ X 7−→
(y(x), z(x)) ∈ cl(Y ×Z) represents an incentive compatible contract if and only if u(·) := G(·, y(·), z(·))
is G-convex on X and y(x) ∈ ∂Gu(x) for each x ∈ X.
Proof. Suppose (y, z) is incentive compatible, then for each x0 ∈ X, let y0 = y(x0), z0 = z(x0),
then u(x0) = G(x0, y(x0), z(x0)) = G(x0, y0, z0); moreover for all x ∈ X, u(x) = G(x, y(x), z(x)) ≥
G(x, y(x0), z(x0)) = G(x, y0, z0). By definition, u is G-convex.
Since u(x0) = G(x0, y0, z0), one has z0 = H(x0, y0, u(x0)). Since for all x ∈ X, u(x) ≥ G(x, y0, z0),
thus u(x) ≥ G(x, y0,H(x0, y0, u(x0))). By definition, y(x0) = y0 ∈ ∂
Gu(x0).
On the other hand, suppose u(x) = G(x, y(x), z(x)) is G-convex, and for each x ∈ X, y(x) ∈
∂Gu(x), so that u(x′) ≥ G(x′, y(x),H(x, y(x), u(x))) = G(x′, y(x), z(x)) for all x′ ∈ X. Then
G(x′, y(x′), z(x′)) ≥ G(x′, y(x), z(x)) for all x, x′ ∈ X. By definition, (y,z) is incentive compatible. 
The following proposition not only reformulates the principal’s problem, but manifests the existence
of maximizer(s). For other existence results guaranteeing this supremum is attained in the non-
quasilinear setting, see No¨ldeke-Samuelson [28] who require mere continuity of the direct utility G,
and Zhang [43] who relaxes relative compactness of the domain.
In this paper, we use Lm to denote Lebesgue measure, which characterizes m-dimensional volume. A
non-negative measure µ is said to be absolutely continuous with respect to Lm if for every measurable
set A, Lm(A) = 0 implies µ(A) = 0. This is written as µ≪ Lm.
Theorem 3.8 (Reformulating the principal’s program using the agents’ indirect utilities). Assume
hypotheses (G0)-(G1)and (G4)–(G5), z¯ < +∞ and µ≪ Lm. Setting
Π˜(u, y) =
∫
X
pi(x, y(x),H(x, y(x), u(x)))dµ(x), the principal’s problem (P0) is equivalent to
(3.8) (P )
{
max Π˜(u, y)
among G-convex u(x) ≥ u∅(x) with y(x) ∈ ∂
Gu(x) for all x ∈ X.
This maximum is attained. Moreover, u determines y(x) uniquely for a.e. x ∈ X.
Proof. 1. Proposition 3.5 encodes a bijective correspondence between lower semicontinuous price
menus v : cl(Y ) −→ cl(Z) with v(y∅) ≤ z∅ and G-convex indirect utilities u ≥ u∅; it also shows (1.1)
is attained. Fix a G-convex u ≥ u∅ and the corresponding price menu v. For each x ∈ X let y(x)
denote the point achieving the maximum (1.1), so that u(x) = G(x, y(x), z(x)) with z(x) := v(y(x)) =
H(x, y(x), u(x)) and Π(v, y) = Π˜(u, y). From (1.1) we see
(3.9) G(·, y(·), v ◦ y(·)) = u(·) ≥ G(·, y(x),H(x, y(x), u(x))),
so that y(x) ∈ ∂Gu(x). Apart from the measurability established below, Lemma 3.7 asserts incentive
compatibility of (y, v ◦ y), while u ≥ u∅ shows individual rationality, so (P ) ≤ (P0).
2. The reverse inequality begins with a lower semicontinuous price menu v : cl(Y ) −→ cl(Z)
with v(y∅) ≤ z∅ and an incentive compatible, individually rational map (y, v ◦ y) on X. Lemma
3.7 then asserts G-convexity of u(·) := G(·, y(·), v(y(·))) and that y(x) ∈ ∂Gu(x) for each x ∈ X.
Choosing · = x in the corresponding inequality (3.9) produces equality, whence (G4) implies v(y(x)) =
H(x, y(x), u(x)) and Π(v, y) = Π˜(u, y). Since u ≥ u∅ follows from individual rationality, we have
established equivalence of (P ) to (P0). Let us now argue the supremum (P ) is attained.
3. Let us first show pi(x, y(x),H(x, y(x), u(x))) is measurable on X for all G-convex u and y(x) ∈
∂Gu(x).
By (G0), we know G is Lipschitz, i.e., there exists L > 0, such that |G(x1, y1, z1) − G(x2, y2, z2)| <
L||(x1 − x2, y1 − y2, z1 − z2)||, for all (x1, y1, z1), (x2, y2, z2) ∈ cl(X × Y ×Z). Since u is G-convex, for
any x1, x2 ∈ X, there exist (y1, z1), (y2, z2) ∈ cl(Y × Z), such that u(xi) = G(xi, yi, zi), for i = 1, 2.
Therefore,
u(x1)− u(x2) ≥ G(x1, y2, z2)−G(x2, y2, z2) > −L||x1 − x2||
u(x1)− u(x2) ≤ G(x1, y1, z1)−G(x2, y1, z1) < L||x1 − x2||
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That is to say, u is also Lipschitz with Lipschitz constant L. By Rademacher’s theorem and µ≪ Lm, we
have µ(X\domDu) = Lm(X\domDu) = 0. Moreover, since u is continuous, ∂u(x)
∂xj
= lim
h→0
u(x+hej)−u(x)
h
is measurable on domDu, for j = 1, 2, ...,m, where ej = (0, ...0, 1, 0, ..., 0) is the unit vector in R
m
with j-th coordinate nonzero. Thus, Du is also Borel on domDu.
Since y(x) ∈ ∂Gu(x), for all x ∈ domDu, we have
(3.10) u(x) = G(x, y(x),H(x, y(x), u(x))), Du(x) = DxG(x, y(x),H(x, y(x), u(x))).
By (G1), there exists a continuous function yG, such that y(x) = yG(x, u(x),Du(x)). Thus y(x) is Borel
on domDu, which implies pi(x, y(x),H(x, y(x), u(x))) is measurable on X, given pi ∈ C0(cl(X×Y ×Z))
and µ ≪ Lm. Here we use the fact that H is also continuous since G is continuous and strictly de-
creasing with respect to its third variable.
4. To show the supremum is attained, let {uk}k∈N be a sequence of G-convex functions , uk(x) ≥
u∅(x) and yk(x) ∈ ∂
Guk(x) for any x ∈ X and k ∈ N, such that limk→∞ Π˜(uk, yk) = sup Π˜(u, y),
among all feasible (u, y). Below we construct a feasible pair (u∞, y∞) attaining the maximum.
4.1. Claim: There exists M > 0, such that |u(x)| < M , for any G-convex u and any x ∈ X. Thus
{uk}k∈N is uniformly bounded.
Proof: Since u is G-convex, for any x ∈ X, there exists (y, z) ∈ cl(Y ×Z), such that u(x) = G(x, y, z).
Notice that G is bounded, since G is continuous on a compact set. Thus, there exists M > 0, such
that |u(x)| = |G(x, y, z)| < M is also bounded.
4.2. From part 1, we know {uk}k∈N are uniformly Lipschitz with Lipschitz constant L, thus {uk}k∈N
are uniformly equicontinuous.
4.3. By Arzela`-Ascoli theorem, there exists a subsequence of {uk}k∈N, again denoted as {uk}k∈N,
and u∞ : X −→ R such that {uk}k∈N converges uniformly to u∞ on X.
4.4. Claim: u∞ is also Lipschitz.
Proof: For any ε > 0, any x1, x2 ∈ X, since {uk}k∈N converges to u∞ uniformly, there exist K > 0,
such that for any k > K, we have |uk(xi)− u∞(xi)| < ε, for i = 1, 2. Therefore,
|u∞(x1)− u∞(x2)| ≤ |uk(x1)− u∞(x1)|+ |uk(x2)− u∞(x2)|+ |uk(x1)− uk(x2)| < 2ε+ L||x1 − x2||.
Since the above inequality is true for all ε > 0, thus u∞ is also Lipschitz.
4.5. For any x ∈ X, since uk(x) ≥ u∅(x) and lim
k→∞
uk(x) = u∞(x), we have u∞(x) ≥ u∅(x). There-
fore, u∞ satisfies the participation constraint.
4.6. For any fixed x ∈ X, since {yk(x)}k∈N ⊂ cl(Y ) which is compact, there exists a subsequence
{ykl(x)}l∈N which converges. Define y∞(x) := lim
l→∞
ykl(x) ∈ cl(Y ). For each l ∈ N, because ykl(x) ∈
∂Gukl(x), by definition, we have ukl(x0) ≥ G(x0, ykl(x),H(x, ykl(x), ukl(x))), for any x0 ∈ X. This
implies, for all x0 ∈ X, we have
u∞(x0) = lim
l→∞
ukl(x0) ≥ lim
l→∞
G(x0, ykl(x),H(x, ykl(x), ukl(x))) ≥ G(x0, y∞(x),H(x, y∞(x), u∞(x))).
Thus, y∞(x) ∈ ∂
Gu∞(x).
Therefore, ∂Gu∞(x) 6= ∅, for any x ∈ X. By Lemma 3.4, this implies u∞ is G-convex.
At this point, we have found a feasible pair (u∞, y∞), satisfying all the constraints in (P).
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4.7. Claim: For any x ∈ domDu∞, the sequence {yk(x)}k∈N ⊂ cl(Y ) converges to y∞(x).
Proof: Since u∞ is Lipschitz, by Rademacher’s theorem, u∞ is differentiable almost everywhere in X,
i.e. µ(X \ domDu∞) = L
m(X \ domDu∞) = 0.
For any x ∈ domDu∞ and any y˜ ∈ ∂
Gu∞(x), we have y˜(x) = yG(x, u∞(x),Du∞(x)), according to
equation (3.10) and hypothesis (G1). This implies ∂Gu∞(x) is a singleton for each x ∈ domDu∞, i.e.
∂Gu∞(x) = {y∞(x)}.
For any x ∈ domDu∞, by similar argument to that above in part 4.6, we can show that any (other)
accumulation points of {yk(x)}k∈N are elements in the set ∂
Gu∞(x) = {y∞(x)}, i.e. the sequence
{yk(x)}k∈N converges to y∞(x).
4.8. Finally, since µ≪ Lm, by Fatou’s lemma, we have
Π˜(u∞, y∞) =
∫
X
pi(x, y∞(x),H(x, y∞(x), u∞(x)))dµ(x)
=
∫
X
lim sup
k→∞
pi(x, yk(x),H(x, yk(x), uk(x)))dµ(x) (because µ≪ L
m)
≥ lim sup
k→∞
∫
X
pi(x, yk(x),H(x, yk(x), uk(x)))dµ(x) (by Fatou’s lemma)
= lim
k→∞
Π˜(uk, yk)
= sup Π˜(u, y),
among all feasible (u,y). Thus, the supremum is attained. 
Remark 3.9 (More Singular measures). If G ∈ C2 (uniformly in z ∈ Z) the same conclusions
extend to µ which need not be absolutely continuous with respect to Lebesgue, provide µ vanishes on
all hypersurfaces parameterized locally as a difference of convex functions [9] [11], essentially because
G-convexity then implies semiconvexity of u. On the other hand, apart from its final sentence, the
proposition extends to all probability measures µ if G is merely continuous, according to No¨ldeke-
Samuelson [28]. Our argument is simpler than theirs on one point however: Borel measurability of
y(x) on domDu follows automatically from (G0)− (G1); in the absence of these extra hypotheses, they
are required to make a measurable selection from among each agent’s preferred products to define y(x).
Remark 3.10 (Tie-breaking rules for singular measures). When an agent x finds more than one
product which maximize his utility, in order to reduce the ambiguity, it is convenient to assume the
principal has satisfactory persuasion to convince the agent to choose one of those products which
maximize the principal’s profit. According to equation (3.2) and condition (G1), this scenario would
occur only for x ∈ X \ domDu, which has Lebesgue measure zero. Thus this convention has no effect
for absolutely continuous measures, but can be used as in Figalli-Kim-McCann [9] to extend our result
to singular measures.
4. Concavity and Convexity Results
The advantage of the reformulation from Section 3 is to make the principal’s objective Π depend
on a scalar function u instead of a vector field y. By (G1), the optimal choice y(x) of Lebesgue almost
every agent x ∈ X is uniquely determined by u. Recall that y¯G(x, u(x),Du(x)) is the unique solution
(y, z) of the system (3.2), for any x ∈ domDu. Then the principal’s problem (P) can be rewritten as
maximizing a functional depending only on the agents’ indirect utility u:
max
u≥u∅
u is G-convex
Π(u) := max
u≥u∅
u is G-convex
∫
X
pi(x, y¯G(x, u(x),Du(x)))dµ(x).
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Define U := {u : X −→ R | u is G-convex} and U∅ := {u ∈ U | u ≥ u∅}. Then the problem
becomes to maximize Π on U∅. In this section, we give conditions under which the function space U∅
is convex and the functional Π is concave, often strictly. Uniqueness and stability of the principal’s
maximizing strategy follow from strict concavity as in [9]. We also provide conditions under which
Π is convex. In this situation, the maximizers of Π may not be unique, but are attained at extreme
points of U∅. (Recall that u ∈ U is called extreme if u does not lie at the midpoint of any segment in U .)
Theorem 4.1 (G-convex functions form a convex set). If G : cl(X×Y ×Z) −→ R satisfies (G0)-(G2),
then (G3) becomes necessary and sufficient for the convexity of the set U .
Proof. Assuming (G0)-(G2), for any u0, u1 ∈ U , define ut(x) := (1 − t)u0(x) + tu1(x), t ∈ (0, 1). We
want to show ut is G-convex as well, for each t ∈ (0, 1).
For any fixed x0 ∈ X, since u0, u1 are G-convex, there exist (y0, z0), (y1, z1) ∈ cl(Y × Z), such that
u0(x0) = G(x0, y0, z0), u1(x0) = G(x0, y1, z1), u0(x) ≥ G(x, y0, z0) and u1(x) ≥ G(x, y1, z1), for all
x ∈ X.
Denote (x0, yt, zt) the G-segment connecting (x0, y0, z0) and (x0, y1, z1). Then ut(x0) = (1 −
t)u0(x0) + tu1(x0) = (1− t)G(x0, y0, z0) + tG(x0, y1, z1) = G(x0, yt, zt), where the last equality comes
from (2.1).
In order to prove ut is G-convex, it remains to show ut(x) ≥ G(x, yt, zt), for all x ∈ X.
By (G3), G(x, yt, zt) is convex in t, i.e., G(x, yt, zt) ≤ (1− t)G(x, y0, z0) + tG(x, y1, z1). So, ut(x) =
(1− t)u0(x) + tu1(x) ≥ (1− t)G(x, y0, z0) + tG(x, y1, z1) ≥ G(x, yt, zt), for each x ∈ X. By definition,
ut is G-convex, i.e., ut ∈ U , for all t ∈ (0, 1). Thus, U is convex.
Conversely, assume U is convex. For any fixed x0 ∈ X, (yt, zt) ∈ cl(Y × Z) with (x0, yt, zt) being a
G-segment, we would like to show G(x, yt, zt) ≤ (1− t)G(x, y0, z0) + tG(x, y1, z1), for any x ∈ X.
Define ui(x) := G(x, yi, zi), for i = 0, 1. Then by definition of G-convexity, u0, u1 ∈ U . Denote
ut := (1 − t)u0 + tu1, for all t ∈ (0, 1). Since U is a convex set, ut is also G-convex. For this x0 and
each t ∈ (0, 1), there exists (y˜t, z˜t) ∈ cl(Y × Z), such that ut(x) ≥ G(x, y˜t, z˜t), for all x ∈ X, and
equality holds at x0. Thus, Dut(x0) = DxG(x0, y˜t, z˜t).
Since (x0, yt, zt) is a G-segment, from (2.1), we know DxG(x0, yt, zt) = (1 − t)DxG(x0, y0, z0) +
tDxG(x0, y1, z1) = (1 − t)Du0(x0) + tDu1(x0) = Dut(x0). Thus, by (G1), (y˜t, z˜t) = (yt, zt), for each
t ∈ (0, 1). Therefore, (1− t)G(x, y0, z0) + tG(x, y1, z1) = ut ≥ G(x, y˜t, z˜t) = G(x, yt, zt), for all x ∈ X,
i.e., G(x, yt, zt) is convex in t along any G-segment (x0, yt, zt). 
The following theorem provides a sufficient and necessary condition for the functional Π(u) to
be concave. It reveals the relationship between linear interpolations on the function space U and
G-segments on the underlying type space cl(Y × Z).
Theorem 4.2 (Concavity of the principal’s objective). If G and pi : cl(X × Y × Z) −→ R satisfy
(G0)-(G5), the following statements are equivalent:
(i) t ∈ [0, 1] 7−→ pi(x, yt, zt) is concave along all G-segments (x, yt, zt);
(ii) Π(u) is concave in U for all µ≪ Lm.
Proof. (i) ⇒ (ii). For any u0, u1 ∈ U , t ∈ (0, 1), define ut = (1 − t)u0 + tu1. We want to prove
Π(ut) ≥ (1− t)Π(u0) + tΠ(u1), for any µ≪ L
m.
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Equations (3.2) implies that there exist y0, y1 : domDu −→ cl(Y ) and z0, z1 : domDu −→ cl(Z) such
that
(Gx, G)(x, y0(x), z0(x)) = (Du0, u0)(x),
(Gx, G)(x, y1(x), z1(x)) = (Du1, u1)(x).
(4.1)
For each x ∈ domDu, (y0(x), z0(x)), (y1(x), z1(x)) ∈ cl(Y × Z), let t ∈ [0, 1] 7−→ (x, yt(x), zt(x)) be
the G-segment connecting (x, y0(x), z0(x)) and (x, y1(x), z1(x)). Combining (4.1) and (2.1), we have
(4.2) (Gx, G)(x, yt(x), zt(x)) = (Dut, ut)(x).
Thus, by concavity of pi on G-segments, for every t ∈ [0, 1],
Π(ut) =
∫
X
pi(x, yt(x), zt(x))dµ(x)
≥
∫
X
(1− t)pi(x, y0(x), z0(x)) + tpi(x, y1(x), z1(x))dµ(x)
= (1− t)Π(u0) + tΠ(u1).
Thus, Π is concave in U .
(ii)⇒ (i). To derive a contradiction, assume (i) fails. Then there exists aG-segment (x0, yt(x0), zt(x0))
and t0 ∈ (0, 1) such that pi(x0, yt0(x0), zt0(x0)) < (1− t0)pi(x0, y0(x0), z0(x0)) + t0pi(x0, y1(x0), z1(x0)).
Let u0(x) := G(x, y0(x0), z0(x0)), u1(x) := G(x, y1(x0), z1(x0)) and ut0 = (1 − t0)u0 + t0u1. Then
u0, u1, ut0 ∈ U . From (4.1) we know, yi(x) ≡ yi(x0), zi(x) ≡ zi(x0), for i = 0, 1. Let t ∈ [0, 1] 7−→
(x, yt(x), zt(x)) be the G-segment connecting (x, y0(x), z0(x)) and (x, y1(x), z1(x)). And combining
(3.2) and (2.1), we have
(Gx, G)(x, y0(x0), z0(x0)) = (Du0, u0)(x),
(Gx, G)(x, y1(x0), z1(x0)) = (Du1, u1)(x).
(Gx, G)(x, yt0(x), zt0(x)) = (Dut0 , ut0)(x).
Since pi, yt0 and zt0 are continuous, there exists ε > 0, such that
pi(x, yt0(x), zt0(x)) < (1− t0)pi(x, y0(x0), z0(x0)) + t0pi(x, y1(x0), z1(x0)), for all x ∈ Bε(x0).
Here we use Bε(x0) denote the open ball in R
m centered at x0 with radius ε. Take dµ = dL
m |Bε(x0)
/Lm(Bε(x0)) to be uniform measure on Bε(x0). Thus,
Π(ut0) =
∫
X
pi(x, yt0(x), zt0(x))dµ(x)
<
∫
X
(1− t0)pi(x, y0(x0), z0(x0)) + t0pi(x, y1(x0), z1(x0))dµ(x)
= (1− t0)Π(u0) + t0Π(u1).
This contradicts the concavity of Π. 
A similar proof shows the following result. Corollary 4.3 implies that concavity of the principal’s
profit is equivalent to concavity of principal’s utility along qualified G-segments. Moreover, Theo-
rem 4.1 and Corollary 4.3 together imply that the principal’s profit Π is a concave functional on a
convex space, under assumptions (G0)-(G5), µ≪ Lm, and (i)′ below.
Corollary 4.3. If G and pi satisfy (G0)–(G5), the following are equivalent:
(i)′ t ∈ [0, 1] 7−→ pi(x, yt(x), zt(x)) is concave along all G-segments (x, yt(x), zt(x)) whose endpoints
satisfy min{G(x, y0(x), z0(x)), G(x, y1(x), z1(x))} ≥ u∅(x);
(ii)′ Π(u) is concave in U∅ for all µ≪ L
m.
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To obtain uniqueness and stability of optimizers requires a stronger form of convexity. Recall
that a function f defined on a convex subset of a normed space is said to be strictly convex if
f((1 − t)x + ty) > (1 − t)f(x) + tf(y) whenever 0 < t < 1 and x 6= y. It is said to be (2-)uniformly
concave, if there exists λ > 0, such that for any x, y in the domain of f and t ∈ [0, 1], the following
inequality holds.
f((1− t)x+ ty)− (1− t)f(x)− tf(y) ≥ t(1− t)λ||x− y||2.
For such strengthenings, it is necessary to view indirect utilities u ∈ U as equivalence classes of
functions which differ only on sets of µ measure zero. More precisely, it is natural to adopt the
Sobolev norm
‖u‖2W 1,2(X,dµ) :=
∫
X
(|u|2 + |Du|2)dµ(x)
on U and U∅. We then have the following results:
Corollary 4.4. Let pi and G satisfy (G0)–(G5). If
(iii) t ∈ [0, 1] 7−→ pi(x, yt, zt) is strictly concave along all G-segments (x, yt, zt), then
(iv) Π(u) is strictly concave in U ⊂W 1,2(X, dµ) for all µ≪ Lm. If
(iii)′ t ∈ [0, 1] 7−→ pi(x, yt(x), zt(x)) is strictly concave along all G-segments (x, yt(x), zt(x)) whose
endpoints satisfy min{G(x, y0(x), z0(x)), G(x, y1(x), z1(x))} ≥ u∅(x), then
(iv)′ Π(u) is strictly concave in U∅ ⊂W
1,2(X, dµ) for all µ≪ Lm.
In addition, Theorem 4.1 and Corollary 4.4 together imply strict concavity of principal’s profit on
a convex space, which guarantees a unique solution to the monopolist’s problem.
Define G¯(x¯, y¯) = G¯(x, x0, y, z) := x0G(x, y, z), where x¯ = (x, x0), y¯ = (y, z) and x0 ∈ X0, where
X0 ⊂ (−∞, 0) is an open bounded interval containing −1. Hereafter, except in Appendix A, we use x0
to denote a number in X0. For further applications, we need the following non-degeneracy assumption.
(G6) G ∈ C2(cl(X×Y ×Z)), andDx¯,y¯(G¯)(x,−1, y, z) has full rank, for each (x, y, z) ∈ cl(X×Y ×Z).
Since (G1) implies m ≥ n, full rank means Dx¯,y¯(G¯)(x,−1, y, z) has rank n+ 1.
Theorem 4.5 (Uniform concavity of the principal’s objective). Assume G ∈ C2(cl(X × Y × Z))
satisfies (G0)-(G6). In case z¯ = +∞, assume the homeomorphisms of (G1) are uniformly bi-Lipschitz.
Then the following statements are equivalent:
(v) Uniformly concavity of pi along G-segments, i.e., there exists λ > 0, for any G-segment (x, yt, zt),
and any t ∈ [0, 1],
pi(x, yt(x), zt(x)) − (1− t)pi(x, y0(x), z0(x)) − tpi(x, y1(x), z1(x))
≥t(1− t)λ||(y1(x)− y0(x), z1(x)− z0(x))||
2
Rn+1
(4.3)
(vi) Π(u) is uniformly concave in U ⊂W 1,2(X, dµ), uniformly for all µ≪ Lm.
Proof. (v) ⇒ (vi). With the same notation as last proof, we want to prove there exists λ˜ > 0, such
that Π(ut) − (1 − t)Π(u0) − tΠ(u1) ≥ t(1 − t)λ˜||u1 − u0||
2
W 1,2(X,dµ), for any µ ≪ L
m, u0, u1 ∈ U and
t ∈ (0, 1).
Similar to last proof, we have (4.1) and (4.2). Denote Lip(Gx, G) the uniform Lipschitz constant of
the map (x, y, z) ∈ X × Y ×Z 7−→ (Gx, G)(x, y, z). Thus by uniformly concavity of pi on G-segments,
there exists λ > 0, such that for every t ∈ [0, 1],
Π(ut)− (1− t)Π(u0)− tΠ(u1)
=
∫
X
pi(x, yt(x), zt(x))− (1− t)pi(x, y0(x), z0(x))− tpi(x, y1(x), z1(x))dµ(x)
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≥∫
X
t(1− t)λ||(y1(x)− y0(x), z1(x)− z0(x))||
2
Rn+1
dµ(x)
≥
∫
X
t(1− t)λ||(Du1(x)−Du0(x), u1(x)− u0(x))||
2
Rn+1
/Lip2(Gx, G)dµ(x)
= t(1− t)
λ
Lip2(Gx, G)
||u1 − u0||W 1,2(X,dµ).
Thus, Π is uniformly concave in U , with λ˜ = λ
Lip2(Gx,G)
> 0.
(vi)⇒ (v). To derive a contradiction, assume (v) fails. Then for any λ > 0, there exists a G-segment
(x0, yt(x
0), zt(x
0)), and some τ ∈ (0, 1), such that pi(x0, yτ (x
0), zτ (x
0))− (1− τ)pi(x0, y0(x
0), z0(x
0))−
τpi(x0, y1(x
0), z1(x
0)) < τ(1− τ)λ||(y1(x
0)− y0(x
0), z1(x
0)− z0(x
0))||2
Rn+1
.
Take u0(x) := G(x, y0(x
0), z0(x
0)), u1(x) := G(x, y1(x
0), z1(x
0)) and for t ∈ (0, 1), assign ut :=
(1 − t)u0 + tu1. Then ut ∈ U , for t ∈ [0, 1]. From (4.1) we know, yi(x) ≡ yi(x
0), zi(x) ≡ zi(x
0),
for i = 0, 1. Let t ∈ [0, 1] 7−→ (x, yt(x), zt(x)) be the G-segment connecting (x, y0(x), z0(x)) and
(x, y1(x), z1(x)). And combining (3.2) and (2.1), we have
(Gx, G)(x, y0(x
0), z0(x
0)) = (Du0, u0)(x),
(Gx, G)(x, y1(x
0), z1(x
0)) = (Du1, u1)(x).
(Gx, G)(x, yt(x), zt(x)) = (Dut, ut)(x).
Since pi, yτ and zτ are continuous, there exists ε > 0, such that for all x ∈ Bε(x
0),
pi(x, yτ (x), zτ (x))− (1− τ)pi(x, y0(x
0), z0(x
0))− τpi(x, y1(x
0), z1(x
0))
< τ(1− τ)λ||(y1(x
0)− y0(x
0), z1(x
0)− z0(x
0))||2
Rn+1
.
Here we use Bε(x
0) denote the open ball in Rm centered at x0 with radius ε. Take dµ = dLm |Bε(x0)
/L(Bε(x
0)) to be uniform measure on Bε(x
0). By (G6), the map y¯G : (x, p, q) 7−→ (y, z), which solves
equation (3.2), is uniformly Lipschitz on X ×R×Rm. Denote Lip(y¯G) its Lipschitz constant.
Thus for such τ , u0, u1 and µ, we have
Π(uτ )− (1− τ)Π(u0)− τΠ(u1)
=
∫
X
pi(x, yτ (x), zτ (x)) − (1− τ)pi(x, y0(x
0), z0(x
0))− τpi(x, y1(x
0), z1(x
0))dµ(x)
<
∫
X
τ(1− τ)λ||(y1 − y0, z1 − z0)||
2
Rn+1
dµ(x)
≤ τ(1− τ)λLip2(y¯G)||u1 − u0||
2
W 1,2(X,dµ).
This contradicts the uniformly concavity of Π. 
A similar argument implies the following equivalence. Theorem 4.1 and Corollary 4.6 together imply
that the principal’s profit Π is a uniformly concave functional on a convex space, under assumptions
(G0)-(G6), µ≪ Lm, and (v)′.
Corollary 4.6. Under the same assumptions as in Theorem 4.5, the following are equivalent:
(v)′ Uniform concavity of pi (in the sense of equation (4.3)) along G-segments (x, yt(x), zt(x)) whose
endpoints satisfy min{G(x, y0(x), z0(x)), G(x, y1(x), z1(x))} ≥ u∅(x);
(vi)′ Π(u) is uniformly concave in U∅ ⊂W
1,2(X, dµ) uniformly for all µ≪ Lm.
The preceding concavity results also have convexity analogs. Unlike strict concavity, strict convexity
does not imply uniqueness of the principal’s profit-maximizing strategy, though it suggests it should
only be attained at extreme points of the strategy space U , where extreme point needs to be interpreted
appropriately.
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Remark 4.7 (Convexity of principal’s objective). If pi and G satisfy (G0)–(G5), the equivalences
(i) ⇔ (ii) and (i)′ ⇔ (ii)′ and implications (iii) ⇒ (iv) and (iii)′ ⇒ (iv)′ remain true when all
occurences of concavity are replaced by convexity. Similarly, the equivalences (v) ⇔ (vi) and (v)′ ⇔
(vi)′ remain true when both occurences of uniform concavity are replaced by uniform convexity in
Theorem 4.5.
We close with several examples, which are established by computing two derivatives of pi(x, yt, zt)
along an arbitrary G-segment t ∈ [0, 1] 7−→ (x, yt, zt). These computations are tedious but straight-
forward.
Assuming (G6), we denote (G¯x¯,y¯)
−1 the left inverse of Dx¯,y¯(G¯)(x, x0, y, z). We will use Einstein
notation for simplifying expressions including summations of vectors, matrices, and general tensors
for higher order derivatives. There are essentially three rules of Einstein summation notation, namely:
1. repeated indices are implicitly summed over; 2. each index can appear at most twice in any term;
3. both sides of an equation must contain the same non-repeated indices. For example, aijvi =
∑
i aijvi,
aijb
kjvk =
∑
j
∑
k aijb
kjvk. We also use comma to separate subscripts: the subscripts before comma
represent derivatives with respect to first variable and those after comma represent derivatives with
respect to second variable. For instance, for b = b(x, y), b,kl represents second derivatives with respect
of y only. And for G = G(x, y, z), where z ∈ R, Gi,jz denotes third order derivatives with respect of
x, y and z, instead of using another comma to separate subscripts corresponding to y and z. Starting
from now, for subscripts, we use i, k, j, l, α, β denoting integers from either {1, ...,m} or {1, ..., n}, and
i¯, k¯, j¯, l¯ denoting augmented indices from {1, ...,m+1} or {1, ..., n+1}. For instance, pii, denotes first
order derivative with respect to x only, pi,k¯j¯ represents Hessian matrix with respect to y¯ only, and
G¯i¯,k¯j¯ denotes a third order derivative tensor which can be viewed as taking x¯-derivative of G¯,k¯j¯.
The following remark reformulates concavity of pi on G-segments using non-positive definiteness
of a matrix. This equivalent form provides a simple method to verify concavity condition stated in
Theorem 4.2. We will apply this matrix form to establish Corollary 4.10 and Example 4.11− 4.13.
Lemma 4.8 (Characterizing concavity of principal’s profit in the smooth case). When G ∈ C3(cl(X×
Y × Z)) satisfies (G0)-(G6) and pi ∈ C2(cl(X × Y × Z)), then differentiating pi along an arbitrary
G-segment t ∈ [0, 1] −→ (x, yt, zt) yields
(4.4)
d2
dt2
pi(x, yt, zt) = (pi,k¯j¯ − pi,l¯G¯
i¯,l¯G¯i¯,k¯j¯) ˙¯y
k¯ ˙¯yj¯
where G¯i¯,l¯ denotes the left inverse of the matrix G¯i¯,k¯ and ˙¯y
k¯ = ( d
dt
)y¯k¯t . Thus (i) in Theorem 4.2 is
equivalent to non-positive definiteness of the quadratic form pi,k¯j¯ − pi,l¯G¯
i¯,l¯G¯i¯,k¯j¯ on Ty¯(Y ×Z) = R
n+1,
for each (x, y¯) ∈ X ×Y ×Z. Similarly, Theorem 4.5 (v) is equivalent to uniform negative definiteness
of the same form.
Before we state another result, we need the following definition, which is a generalized Legendre
transform (see Moreau [25], Kutateladze-Rubinov [17], Elster-Nehse [8], Balder [2], Dolecki-Kurcyusz
[7], Gangbo-McCann[10], Singer[37], Rubinov[35, 36], and Mart´ınez-Legaz [20] for more references).
Definition 4.9 (G¯-concavity, G¯∗-concavity). A function φ : cl(X ×X0) −→ R is called G¯-concave if
φ = (φG¯
∗
)G¯ and a function ψ : cl(Y × Z) −→ R is called G¯∗-concave if ψ = (ψG¯)G¯
∗
, where
(4.5) ψG¯(x¯) = min
y¯∈cl(Y×Z)
G¯(x¯, y¯) − ψ(y¯) and φG¯
∗
(y¯) = min
x¯∈cl(X×X0)
G¯(x¯, y¯) − φ(x¯).
We say ψ is strictly G¯∗-concave, if in addition ψG¯ ∈ C1(X ×X0).
Note that, apart from an overall sign and the extra variables, Definition 4.9 coincides with a
quasilinear version G(x¯, y¯, z) = G¯(x¯, y¯) − z of Definition 3.2.
The following corollary characterizes the concavity of principal’s profit when her utility on one hand
is not influenced by the agents’ identity, and on the other hand has adequate generality to encompass a
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tangled nonlinear relationship between products and selling prices. It generalizes the convexity result
in Figalli-Kim-McCann [9], where G(x, y, z) = b(x, y) − z and pi(x, y, z) = z − a(y). See Appendix B
for a (partial) converse.
Corollary 4.10 (Concavity of principal’s objective with her utility not depending on agents’ types).
If G ∈ C3(cl(X × Y × Z)) satisfies (G0)-(G6), pi ∈ C2(cl(Y × Z)) is G¯∗-concave and µ ≪ Lm, then
Π is concave.
For specific non-quasilinear agent preferences, we use the explicit expression above for the desired
second derivative to establish the following examples, which assume the principal is indifferent to
whom she transacts business with and that her preferences depend linearly on payments. These
examples give conditions under which the principal’s program inherits concavity or convexity from
the agents’ price sensitivity. Although the resulting conditions appear complicated, they illustrate the
subtle interplay between the preferences of agent and principal for products in the first example, and
between the preferences of the agents for products as opposed to prices in the second.
Example 4.11 (Nonlinear yet homogeneous sensitivity of agents to prices). Take pi(x, y, z) = z−a(y),
G(x, y, z) = b(x, y)− f(z), satisfying (G0)-(G6), G ∈ C3(cl(X ×Y ×Z)), pi ∈ C2(cl(X ×Y ×Z)), and
assume z¯ < +∞.
1. If f(z) is convex [respectively concave] in cl(Z), then Π(u) is concave [respectively convex] for all
µ≪ Lm if and only if there exist ε ≥ 0 such that each (x, y, z) ∈ X × Y × Z and ξ ∈ Rn satisfy
(4.6) ±
{
akj(y)−
b,kj(x, y)
f ′(z)
+
(b,l(x, y)
f ′(z)
− al(y)
)
bi,l(x, y)bi,kj(x, y)
}
ξkξj ≥ ε | ξ |2 .
2. In addition, Π(u) is uniformly concave [respectively uniformly convex] on W 1,2(X, dµ) uniformly
for all µ≪ Lm if and only if ±f ′′ > 0 and (4.6) holds with ε > 0.
Although the next two examples are not completely general, they have the following economic
interpretation. The same selling price impacts utility differently for different types of agents. In other
words, it models the situation where agents have different sensitivities to the same price. In Example
4.12, the principal’s utility is linear and depends exclusively on her revenue, which is a simple special
case of Example 4.13.
Example 4.12 (Inhomogeneous sensitivity of agents to prices, zero cost). Take pi(x, y, z) = z,
G(x, y, z) = b(x, y)− f(x, z), satisfying (G0)–(G6), G ∈ C3(cl(X × Y × Z)), pi ∈ C2(cl(X × Y × Z)),
and assume z¯ < +∞. Suppose Dx,yb(x, y) has full rank for each (x, y) ∈ X × Y , and denote its left
inverse bi,l(x, y).
1. If (x, y, z) 7−→ h(x, y, z) := f(x, z) − b,l(x, y)b
i,l(x, y)fi,(x, z) is strictly increasing and convex [re-
spectively concave] with respect to z, then Π(u) is concave [respectively convex] for all µ≪ Lm if and
only if there exist ε ≥ 0 such that each (x, y) ∈ X × Y and ξ ∈ Rn satisfy
(4.7) ±
{
− b,kj(x, y) + b,l(x, y)b
i,l(x, y)bi,kj(x, y)
}
ξkξj ≥ ε | ξ |2 .
2. In addition, Π(u) is uniformly concave [respectively uniformly convex] on W 1,2(X, dµ) uniformly
for all µ≪ Lm if and only if ±hzz > 0 and (4.7) holds with ε > 0.
Example 4.13 (Inhomogeneous sensitivity of agents to prices). Take pi(x, y, z) = z−a(y), G(x, y, z) =
b(x, y) − f(x, z), satisfying (G0)-(G6), G ∈ C3(cl(X × Y × Z)), pi ∈ C2(cl(X × Y × Z)), and assume
z¯ < +∞. Suppose Dx,yb(x, y) has full rank for each (x, y) ∈ X × Y , and 1− (fz)
−1b,βb
α,βfα,z 6= 0, for
all (x, y, z) ∈ X × Y × Z.
1. If (x, y, z) 7−→ h(x, y, z) := alb
i,lfi,zz +
[aβb
α,βfα,z−1][b,lb
i,lfi,zz−fzz]
fz−b,βbα,βfα,z
≥ 0[≤ 0] , then Π(u) is concave
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[respectively convex] for all µ≪ Lm if and only if there exist ε ≥ 0 such that each (x, y, z) ∈ X×Y ×Z
and ξ ∈ Rn satisfy
(4.8) ±
{
akj − alb
i,lbi,kj +
1− aβb
α,βfα,z
1− (fz)−1b,βbα,βfα,z
[
−
b,kj
fz
+
b,l
fz
bi,lbi,kj
]}
ξkξj ≥ ε | ξ |2 .
2. If in addition, Π(u) is uniformly concave [respectively uniformly convex] on W 1,2(X, dµ) uniformly
for all µ≪ Lm if and only if ±h > 0 and (4.8) holds with ε > 0.
Example 4.14 asserts the concavity of monopolist’s maximization in the zero-sum setting, where
the agent’s utilities are relatively general but the principal’s profit is extremely special. In addition,
more non-quasilinear examples could be discovered by applying Lemma 4.8.
Example 4.14 (Zero sum transactions). Take pi(x, y, z) = −G(x, y, z), satisfying (G0)-(G5) and
µ ≪ Lm, which means the monopolist’s profit in each transaction coincides exactly with the agent’s
loss. From (2.1), since G is linear on G-segments, we know Π(u) is linear.
5. Proofs
In this section, we prove Lemma 4.8, Corollary 4.10, Example 4.11 and 4.13.
Proof of Lemma 4.8. For any G-segments (x, yt, zt) satisfying equation (4.2) and pi ∈ C
2(cl(X × Y ×
Z)), t ∈ [0, 1] 7−→ pi(x, yt, zt) is concave [uniformly concave] if and only if
d2
dt2
pi(x, yt, zt) ≤ 0 [≤
−λ||(y˙t, z˙t)||
2
Rn+1
< 0], for all t ∈ [0, 1].
On the one hand, since d
dt
pi(x, yt, zt) = pi,k¯ ˙¯y
k¯, taking another derivative with respect of t gives
(5.1)
d2
dt2
pi(x, yt, zt) = pi,k¯j¯ ˙¯y
k¯ ˙¯yj¯ + pi,l¯ ¨¯y
l¯
On the other hand, taking second derivative with respect of t at both sides of equation (4.2), which is
equivalent to G¯i¯,(x, x0, yt(x), zt(x)) = (x0Dut, ut)(x), for some fixed x0 ∈ X0, implies
(5.2) G¯i¯,k¯j¯ ˙¯y
k¯ ˙¯yj¯ + G¯i¯,k¯ ¨¯y
k¯ = 0
Combining equations (5.1) with (5.2) yields (4.4). For x ∈ X, there is a G-segment with any given
tangent direction through y¯ = (y, z) ∈ Y × Z. Thus, the non-positivity of d
2
dt2
pi(x, yt, zt) along all
G-segments (x, yt, zt) is equivalent to non-positive definiteness of the matrix (pi,k¯j¯ − pi,l¯G¯
i¯,l¯G¯i¯,k¯j¯) on
Ty¯(Y × Z) = R
n+1.
In addition, the uniformly concavity of pi(x, yt, zt) along all G-segments (x, yt, zt) is equivalent to
uniform negative definiteness of (pi,k¯j¯ − pi,l¯G¯
i¯,l¯G¯i¯,k¯j¯) on R
n+1. 
Proof of Corollary 4.10. According to Lemma 4.8, for concavity, we only need to show non-positive
definiteness of (pik¯j¯−pil¯G¯
i¯,l¯G¯i¯,k¯j¯) on R
n+1, i.e., for any x¯ = (x, x0) ∈ X×X0, y¯ ∈ Y ×Z and ξ ∈ R
n+1,(
pik¯j¯(y¯)− pil¯(y¯)G¯
i¯,l¯(x¯, y¯)G¯i¯,k¯j¯(x¯, y¯)
)
ξk¯ξj¯ ≤ 0.
For any fixed x¯ = (x, x0) ∈ X ×X0, y¯ ∈ Y × Z, ξ ∈ R
n+1, there exist δ > 0 and t ∈ (−δ, δ) 7−→ y¯t ∈
Y × Z, such that y¯t|t=0 = y¯, ˙¯y|t=0 = ξ and
d2
dt2
G¯i¯,(x¯, y¯t) = 0. Thus,
(5.3) 0 =
d2
dt2
∣∣∣∣
t=0
G¯i¯,(x¯, y¯t) = G¯i¯,k¯j¯(x¯, y¯)ξ
k¯ξj¯ + G¯i¯,k¯(x¯, y¯)(¨¯yt)
k¯
∣∣∣
t=0
Since pi is G¯∗-concave, we have pi(y¯) = minx˜∈cl(X×X0) G¯(x˜, y¯) − φ(x˜), for some G¯-concave function
φ. Since cl(X × X0) is compact, for this y¯, there exists x¯
∗ = (x∗, x0
∗) ∈ cl(X × X0), such that
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pil¯(y¯) = G¯,l¯(x¯
∗, y¯) for each l¯ = 1, 2, ..., n + 1 and pik¯j¯(y¯)ξ
k¯ξj¯ ≤ G¯,k¯j¯(x¯
∗, y¯)ξk¯ξj¯ for each ξ ∈ Rn+1.
Combined with (5.3) this yields(
pik¯j¯(y¯)− pil¯(y¯)G¯
i¯,l¯(x¯, y¯)G¯i¯,k¯j¯(x¯, y¯)
)
ξk¯ξj¯
≤
(
G¯,k¯j¯(x¯
∗, y¯)− G¯,l¯(x¯
∗, y¯)G¯i¯,l¯(x¯, y¯)G¯i¯,k¯j¯(x¯, y¯)
)
ξk¯ξj¯
= G¯,k¯j¯(x¯
∗, y¯)ξk¯ξj¯ + G¯,l¯(x¯
∗, y¯) · (¨¯yt)
l¯
∣∣
t=0
=
d2
dt2
∣∣∣∣
t=0
G¯(x¯∗, y¯t)
= x0
∗ ·
d2
dt2
∣∣∣∣
t=0
G(x∗, y¯t)
≤ 0.
(5.4)
The last inequality comes from x0
∗ ≤ 0 and (G3). 
Proof of Example 4.11. From Lemma 4.8, Π(u) is concave for all µ ≪ Lm if and only if (pi,k¯j¯ −
pi,l¯G¯
i¯,l¯G¯i¯,k¯j¯)
∣∣
x0=−1
is non-positive definite, and uniformly concave uniformly for all µ ≪ Lm if and
only if this matrix is uniform negative definite.
In this example, we have pi(x, y, z) = z−a(y), G¯(x, x0, y, z) = x0G(x, y, z) = x0(b(x, y)− f(z)). Thus,
pi,k¯j¯ =
(
−akj 0
0 0
)
, pi,l¯ = (−al, 1), G¯i¯,l¯
∣∣
x0=−1
=
(
−bi,l 0
b,l −f
′(z)
)
.
By (G4), f ′(z) > 0 for all z ∈ cl(Z). By (G6), since G¯i¯,l¯
∣∣
x0=−1
has the full rank, the matrix (bi,l) also
has its full rank. Taking bi,l as its left inverse, we have
G¯i¯,l¯
∣∣
x0=−1
=
(
−bi,l 0
−
b,lb
i,l
f ′(z)
1
−f ′(z)
)
, G¯i¯,k¯j¯
∣∣
x0=−1
=
(
−bi,kj¯ 0
b,kj¯ (−f
′(z))j¯
)
.
Therefore,
(pi,k¯j¯ − pi,l¯G¯
i¯,l¯G¯i¯,k¯j¯)
∣∣
x0=−1
=
(
−akj 0
0 0
)
−
(
(−alb
i,l +
b,l
f ′(z)b
i,l)bi,kj¯ −
b,kj¯
f ′(z) ,
(f ′(z))j¯
f ′(z)
)
= −
(
akj + (−al +
b,l
f ′(z))b
i,lbi,kj −
b,kj
f ′(z) 0
0 f
′′(z)
f ′(z)
)
.
Since (G4) and f is convex, we have f ′(z) > 0 and f ′′(z) ≥ 0, for all z ∈ cl(Z). Thus, pi,k¯j¯−pi,l¯G¯
i¯,l¯G¯i¯,k¯j¯
is non-positive definite if and only if akj + (−al +
b,l
f ′(z))b
i,lbi,kj −
b,kj
f ′(z) is non-negative definite, i.e.,
there exist ε ≥ 0 such that each (x, y, z) ∈ X × Y × Z and ξ ∈ Rn satisfy{
akj(y)−
b,kj(x, y)
f ′(z)
+
(b,l(x, y)
f ′(z)
− al(y)
)
bi,l(x, y)bi,kj(x, y)
}
ξkξj ≥ ε | ξ |2 .
In addition, pi,k¯j¯ − pi,l¯G¯
i¯,l¯G¯i¯,k¯j¯ is uniform negative definite if and only if f
′′ > 0 and ε > 0, which
is equivalent to that Π(u) is uniformly concave uniformly for all µ ≪ Lm. Similarly, one can show
equivalent conditions for Π(u) being convex or uniformly convex. 
Proof of Example 4.13. Similar to the proof of Example 4.11, Π(u) is concave for all µ ≪ Lm if and
only if (pi,k¯j¯ − pi,l¯G¯
i¯,l¯G¯i¯,k¯j¯) is non-positive definite, and uniformly concave uniformly for all µ≪ L
m if
and only if this tensor is uniform negative definite.
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Since Dx,yb(x, y) has full rank for each (x, y) ∈ X×Y , and 1− (fz)
−1b,βb
α,βfα,z 6= 0, for all (x, y, z) ∈
X × Y × Z, for pi(x, y, z) = z − a(y), G¯(x, x0, y, z) = x0(b(x, y) − f(x, z)), we have
(pi,k¯j¯ − pi,l¯G¯
i¯,l¯G¯i¯,k¯j¯)
= −


akj − alb
i,lbi,kj
+
[aβb
α,βfα,z − 1][b,kj − b,lb
i,lbi,kj]
fz − b,βbα,βfα,z
0
0
alb
i,lfi,zz
+
[aβb
α,βfα,z − 1][b,lb
i,lfi,zz − fzz]
fz − b,βbα,βfα,z


.
Since h(x, y, z) ≥ 0 , then (pi,k¯j¯ − pi,l¯G¯
i¯,l¯G¯i¯,k¯j¯) is non-positive definite if and only if there exist ε ≥ 0
such that each (x, y, z) ∈ X × Y × Z and ξ ∈ Rn satisfy{
akj − alb
i,lbi,kj +
[aβb
α,βfα,z − 1][b,kj − b,lb
i,lbi,kj]
fz − b,βbα,βfα,z
}
ξkξj ≥ ε | ξ |2 .
In addition, Π(u) is uniformly concave uniformly for all µ≪ Lm if and only if h > 0 and ε > 0. 
Appendix A. A fourth-order differential re-expression of (G3)
In our convexity argument, hypothesis (G3) plays a crucial role. In this section, we localize this
hypothesis using differential calculus. The resulting expression shows it to be a direct analog of the
non-negative cross-curvature (B3) from [9], which in turn was inspired by [19].
In this section only, we assume the dimensions of spaces X and Y are equal, i.e., m = n. Before the
statement, we need to extend the twist and convex range hypotheses (G1) and (G2) to the function
H in place of G. This is equivalent to assuming:
(G7) For each (y, z) ∈ cl(Y × Z) the map x ∈ X 7−→
Gy
Gz
(·, y, z) is one-to-one;
(G8) its range X(y,z) :=
Gy
Gz
(X, y, z) ⊂ Rn is convex.
For any vectors p,w ∈ Rn, we denote p ‖ w if p and w are parallel.
Proposition A.1. Assume (G0)-(G2) and (G4)-(G8). If, in addition, G ∈ C4(cl(X × Y × Z)), then
the following statements are equivalent:
(i) (G3).
(ii) For any given x0, x1 ∈ X, any curve (yt, zt) ∈ cl(Y ×Z) connecting (y0, z0) and (y1, z1), we have
∂2
∂s2
(
1
Gz(xs, yt, zt)
∂2
∂t2
G(xs, yt, zt)
)∣∣∣∣∣
t=t0
≤ 0,
whenever s ∈ [0, 1] 7−→ Gy
Gz
(xs, yt0 , zt0) forms an affinely parametrized line segment for some
t0 ∈ [0, 1].
(iii) For any given curve xs ∈ X connecting x0 and x1, any (y0, z0), (y1, z1) ∈ cl(Y × Z), we have
∂2
∂s2
(
1
Gz(xs, yt, zt)
∂2
∂t2
G(xs, yt, zt)
)∣∣∣∣∣
s=s0
≤ 0,
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whenever t ∈ [0, 1] 7−→ (Gx, G)(xs0 , yt, zt) forms an affinely parametrized line segment for some
s0 ∈ [0, 1].
Proof. (i) ⇒ (ii). Suppose for some t0 ∈ [0, 1], s ∈ [0, 1] 7−→
Gy
Gz
(xs, yt0 , zt0) forms an affinely
parametrized line segment.
For any fixed s0 ∈ [0, 1], consider xs0 ∈ X, there is a G-segment (xs0 , y
s0
t , z
s0
t ) passing through
(xs0 , yt0 , zt0) at t = t0 with the same tangent vector as (xs0 , yt, zt) at t = t0, i.e., there exists another
curve (ys0t , z
s0
t ) ∈ cl(Y × Z), such that (y
s0
t , z
s0
t ) |t=t0= (yt, zt) |t=t0 , (y˙t
s0 , z˙t
s0) |t=t0‖ (y˙t, z˙t) |t=t0 , and
(Gx, G)(xs0 , y
s0
t , z
s0
t ) = (1− t)(Gx, G)(xs0 , y
s0
0 , z
s0
0 ) + t(Gx, G)(xs0 , y
s0
1 , z
s0
1 ).
Computing the fourth mixed derivative yields
∂2
∂s2
(
1
Gz(xs, yt, zt)
∂2
∂t2
G(xs, yt, zt)
)
=
∂2
∂s2
(
1
Gz
)
∂2
∂t2
G+ 2
∂
∂s
(
1
Gz
)
∂3
∂s∂t2
G+
1
Gz
∂4
∂s2∂t2
G
=[−(Gz)
−2Gi,zx¨s
i − (Gz)
−2Gij,zx˙s
ix˙s
j + 2(Gz)
−3Gi,zGj,zx˙s
ix˙s
j][G,k y¨t
k +Gz z¨t +G,kly˙t
ky˙t
l
+ 2G,kz y˙t
kz˙t +Gzz(z˙t)
2]
+ 2[−(Gz)
−2Gi,zx˙s
i][Gj,kx˙s
j y¨t
k +Gj,zx˙s
j z¨t +Gj,klx˙s
j y˙t
ky˙t
l + 2Gj,kzx˙s
j y˙t
kz˙t +Gj,zzx˙s
j(z˙t)
2]
+ (Gz)
−1[Gi,kx¨s
iy¨t
k +Gij,kx˙s
ix˙s
j y¨t
k +Gi,zx¨s
iz¨t +Gij,zx˙s
ix˙s
j z¨t +Gi,klx¨s
iy˙t
ky˙t
l +Gij,klx˙s
ix˙s
j y˙t
ky˙t
l
+ 2Gi,kzx¨s
iy˙t
kz˙t + 2Gij,kzx˙s
ix˙s
j y˙t
kz˙t +Gi,zzx¨s
i(z˙t)
2 +Gij,zzx˙s
ix˙s
j(z˙t)
2]
=[((Gz)
−1Gi,k − (Gz)
−2Gi,zG,k)x¨s
i + ((Gz)
−1Gij,k − (Gz)
−2G,kGij,z − 2(Gz)
−2Gi,zGj,k
+ 2(Gz)
−3G,kGi,zGj,z)x˙s
ix˙s
j]y¨t
k
+ [(Gz)
−1Gi,kl − (Gz)
−2Gi,zG,kl]x¨s
iy˙t
ky˙t
l
+ [(Gz)
−1Gij,kl − (Gz)
−2Gij,zG,kl + 2(Gz)
−3Gi,zGj,zG,kl − 2(Gz)
−2Gi,zGj,kl]x˙s
ix˙s
j y˙t
ky˙t
l
+ [2(Gz)
−1Gi,kz − 2(Gz)
−2Gi,zG,kz]x¨s
iy˙t
kz˙t
+ [2(Gz)
−1Gij,kz − 2(Gz)
−2Gij,zG,kz + 4(Gz)
−3Gi,zGj,zG,kz − 4(Gz)
−2Gi,zGj,kz]x˙s
ix˙s
j y˙t
kz˙t
+ [(Gz)
−1Gi,zz − (Gz)
−2Gi,zGzz]x¨s
i(z˙t)
2
+ [(Gz)
−1Gij,zz − (Gz)
−2Gij,zGzz + 2(Gz)
−3Gi,zGj,zGzz − 2(Gz)
−2Gi,zGj,zz]x˙s
ix˙s
j(z˙t)
2.
The coefficient of y¨t
k vanishes when this expression is evaluated at t = t0, due to the assumption that
s ∈ [0, 1] 7−→ Gy
Gz
(xs, yt0 , zt0) forms an affinely parametrized line segment, which implies
0 =
∂2
∂s2
Gy
Gz
(xs, yt0 , zt0)
=[((Gz)
−1Gi,y − (Gz)
−2Gi,zG,y)x¨
i + ((Gz)
−1Gij,y − (Gz)
−2G,yGij,z − 2(Gz)
−2Gi,zGj,y
+ 2(Gz)
−3G,yGi,zGj,z)x˙
ix˙j ], for all s ∈ [0, 1].
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Since (y˙t
s0 , z˙t
s0)|t=t0 ‖ (y˙t, z˙t)|t=t0 , there exists some constant C1 > 0, such that (y˙t, z˙t)|t=t0 =
C1(y˙t
s0 , z˙t
s0)|t=t0 . Moreover, since (yt, zt) |t=t0= (y
s0
t , z
s0
t ) |t=t0 , we have
∂2
∂s2
(
1
Gz(xs, yt, zt)
∂2
∂t2
G(xs, yt, zt)
)∣∣∣∣∣
t=t0
= C21
∂2
∂s2
(
1
Gz(xs, y
s0
t , z
s0
t )
∂2
∂t2
G(xs, y
s0
t , z
s0
t )
)∣∣∣∣∣
t=t0
.
Denote g(s) := ∂
2
∂t2
|t=t0G(xs, y
s0
t , z
s0
t ), for s ∈ [0, 1]. Since (xs0 , y
s0
t , z
s0
t ) is a G-segment, by (G3), we
have g(s) ≥ 0, for all s ∈ [0, 1]. By definition of (ys0t , z
s0
t ), it is clear that g(s0) = 0. The first- and
second-order conditions for an interior minimum then give g′(s0) = 0 ≤ g
′′(s0); (in fact g
′(s0) = 0 also
follows directly from the definition of a G-segment).
By the assumption (G4), we have Gz < 0, thus,
∂2
∂s2
(
1
Gz(xs, yt, zt)
∂2
∂t2
G(xs, yt, zt)
)∣∣∣∣∣
(s,t)=(s0,t0)
=C21
∂2
∂s2
(
1
Gz(xs, y
s0
t , z
s0
t )
∂2
∂t2
G(xs, y
s0
t , z
s0
t )
)∣∣∣∣∣
(s,t)=(s0,t0)
=C21
∂2
∂s2
∣∣∣∣∣
(s,t)=(s0,t0)
(
1
Gz
(xs, y
s0
t , z
s0
t )
)
g(s0) + 2C
2
1
∂
∂s
∣∣∣∣∣
(s,t)=(s0,t0)
(
1
Gz(xs, y
s0
t , z
s0
t )
)
g′(s0)
+
C21
Gz(xs, y
s0
t , z
s0
t )
g′′(s0)
≤0.
(ii) ⇒ (i). For any fixed x0 ∈ X and G-segment (x0, yt, zt), we need to show
∂2
∂t2
G(x1, yt, zt) ≥ 0,
for all t ∈ [0, 1] and x1 ∈ X.
For any fixed t0 ∈ [0, 1] and x1 ∈ X, define xs as the solution xˆ to the equation
(A.1)
Gy
Gz
(xˆ, yt0 , zt0) = (1− s)
Gy
Gz
(x0, yt0 , zt0) + s
Gy
Gz
(x1, yt0 , zt0).
By (G7) and (G8), xs is uniquely determined for each s ∈ (0, 1). In addition, x0 and x1 satisfy the
above equation for s = 0 and s = 1, respectively.
Define g(s) := 1
Gz(xs,yt,zt)
∂2
∂t2
G(xs, yt, zt)
∣∣∣
t=t0
for s ∈ [0, 1].
Then g(0) = 0 = g′(0) from the two conditions defining a G-segment.
In our setting, s ∈ [0, 1] 7−→ Gy
Gz
(xs, yt0 , zt0) forms an affinely parametrized line segment, thus
0 ≥ ∂
2
∂s2
(
1
Gz(xs,yt,zt)
∂2
∂t2
G(xs, yt, zt)
)∣∣∣
t=t0
= g′′(s) for all s ∈ [0, 1] by hypothesis (ii).
Hence g is concave in [0, 1], and g(0) = 0 is a critical point, thus g(1) ≤ 0. Since Gz < 0 this implies
∂2
∂t2
∣∣∣
t=t0
G(x1, yt, zt) ≥ 0 for any t0 ∈ [0, 1] and x1 ∈ X, as desired.
(i) ⇒ (iii). For any fixed s0 ∈ [0, 1], suppose t ∈ [0, 1] 7−→ (Gx, G)(xs0 , yt, zt) forms an affinely
parametrized line segment. For any fixed t0 ∈ [0, 1], define g(s) :=
(
1
Gz(xs,yt,zt)
∂2
∂t2
G(xs, yt, zt)
)∣∣∣
t=t0
,
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for all s ∈ [0, 1]. By (G3)–(G4), we know g(s) ≤ 0, for all s ∈ [0, 1]. By the definition of (yt, zt), we
have g(s0) = g
′(s0) = 0. Thus g
′′(s0) ≤ 0.
(iii) ⇒ (i). For any fixed x0 ∈ X, suppose (x0, y
0
t , z
0
t ) is a G-segment, then we need to show
∂2
∂t2
G(x1, y
0
t , z
0
t ) ≥ 0, for all t ∈ [0, 1], x1 ∈ X.
For any fixed t0 ∈ [0, 1], x1 ∈ X, define xs as the solution xˆ of equation
(A.2)
Gy
Gz
(xˆ, y0t0 , z
0
t0
) = (1− s)
Gy
Gz
(x0, y
0
t0
, z0t0) + s
Gy
Gz
(x1, y
0
t0
, z0t0).
By (G7) and (G8), xs is uniquely determined for each s ∈ (0, 1). In addition, x0 and x1 satisfy the
above equation for s = 0 and s = 1 respectively.
Define g(s) := 1
Gz(xs,y0t ,z
0
t )
∂2
∂t2
G(xs, y
0
t , z
0
t )
∣∣∣
t=t0
, for s ∈ [0, 1].
Then g(0) = g′(0) = 0 by the two conditions defining a G-segment.
For any fixed s0 ∈ [0, 1], there is a G-segment (xs0 , y
s0
t , z
s0
t ) passing through (xs0 , y
0
t0
, z0t0) at t = t0
with the same tangent vector as (xs0 , y
0
t , z
0
t ) at t = t0, i.e., there exists another curve (y
s0
t , z
s0
t ) ∈
cl(Y × Z) and some constant C2 > 0, such that (y
s0
t , z
s0
t ) |t=t0= (y
0
t , z
0
t ) |t=t0 , (y˙t
s0 , z˙t
s0) |t=t0=
1
C2
(y˙0t , z˙
0
t ) |t=t0 , and (Gx, G)(xs0 , y
s0
t , z
s0
t ) = (1− t)(Gx, G)(xs0 , y
s0
0 , z
s0
0 ) + t(Gx, G)(xs0 , y
s0
1 , z
s0
1 ).
Computing the mixed fourth derivative yields
∂2
∂s2
(
1
Gz(xs, y0t , z
0
t )
∂2
∂t2
G(xs, y
0
t , z
0
t )
)∣∣∣∣∣
(s,t)=(s0,t0)
=C22
∂2
∂s2
(
1
Gz(xs, y
s0
t , z
s0
t )
∂2
∂t2
G(xs, y
s0
t , z
s0
t )
)∣∣∣∣∣
(s,t)=(s0,t0)
,
where the equality is derived from the condition that s ∈ [0, 1] 7−→ Gy
Gz
(xs, yt0 , zt0) forms an affinely
parametrized line segment, (ys0t , z
s0
t ) |t=t0= (yt, zt) |t=t0 and (y˙
0
t , z˙
0
t ) |t=t0= C2(y˙t
s0 , z˙t
s0) |t=t0 . More-
over, the latter expression is non-positive by assumption (iii).
Thus g′′(s0) ≤ 0 for all s0 ∈ [0, 1]. Since g is concave in [0, 1], and g(0) = 0 is a critical point,
we have g(1) ≤ 0. Thus Gz < 0 implies
∂2
∂t2
∣∣∣
t=t0
G(x1, y
0
t , z
0
t ) ≥ 0 for all t0 ∈ [0, 1] and x1 ∈ X, as
desired. 
For strictly concavity of the profit functional, one might need a strict version of hypothesis (G3):
(G3)s For each x, x0 ∈ X and x 6= x0, assume t ∈ [0, 1] 7−→ G(x, yt, zt) is strictly convex along all
G-segments (x0, yt, zt) defined in (2.1).
Remark A.2. Strict inequality in (ii) [or (iii)] implies (G3)s but the reverse is not necessarily true,
i.e. (G3)s is intermediate in strength between (G3) and strict inequality version of (ii) [or (iii)].
Besides, strict inequality versions of (ii) and (iii) are equivalent, and denoted by (G3)u.
Note inequality (A.3) below and its strict and uniform versions (G3)s and (G3)u precisely generalize
of the analogous hypotheses (B3), (B3)s and (B3)u from the quasilinear case [9].
Proof. We only show strict inequality of (ii) implies that of (iii) here, since the other direction is
similar.
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For any fixed s0 ∈ [0, 1], suppose t ∈ [0, 1] 7−→ (Gx, G)(xs0 , yt, zt) forms an affinely parametrized
line segment. For any fixed t0 ∈ [0, 1], define x
t0
s as a solution to the equation
Gy
Gz
(xt0s , yt0 , zt0) =
(1−s)Gy
Gz
(xt00 , yt0 , zt0)+s
Gy
Gz
(xt01 , yt0 , zt0), with initial conditions x
t0
s |s=s0 = xs0 and x˙
t0
s |s=s0 = C1x˙s|s=s0 ,
for some constant C1 > 0. Thus, by strict inequality of (ii), we have
0 >
∂2
∂s2
( 1
Gz(x
t0
s , yt, zt)
∂2
∂t2
G(xt0s , yt, zt)
)∣∣∣
(s,t)=(s0,t0)
=
∂2
∂s2
( 1
Gz(x
t0
s , yt, zt)
) ∂2
∂t2
G(xt0s , yt, zt)
∣∣∣
(s,t)=(s0,t0)
+
∂
∂s
( 1
Gz(x
t0
s , yt, zt)
) ∂3
∂s∂t2
G(xt0s , yt, zt)
∣∣∣
(s,t)=(s0,t0)
+
1
Gz(x
t0
s , yt, zt)
∂4
∂s2∂t2
G(xt0s , yt, zt)
∣∣∣
(s,t)=(s0,t0)
=−
Gx,z(x
t0
s , yt, zt)
G2z(x
t0
s , yt, zt)
∂2
∂t2
Gx(x
t0
s , yt, zt)(x˙
t0
s )
2
∣∣∣
(s,t)=(s0,t0)
+
1
Gz(x
t0
s , yt, zt)
∂2
∂t2
Gxx(x
t0
s , yt, zt)(x˙
t0
s )
2
∣∣∣
(s,t)=(s0,t0)
=C21
[
−
Gx,z(xs, yt, zt)
G2z(xs, yt, zt)
∂2
∂t2
Gx(xs, yt, zt)(x˙s)
2
∣∣∣
(s,t)=(s0,t0)
+
1
Gz(xs, yt, zt)
∂2
∂t2
Gxx(xs, yt, zt)(x˙s)
2
∣∣∣
(s,t)=(s0,t0)
]
=C21
∂2
∂s2
( 1
Gz(xs, yt, zt)
∂2
∂t2
G(xs, yt, zt)
)∣∣∣
(s,t)=(s0,t0)
.
Here we use the initial condition xt0s |s=s0 = xs0 and x˙
t0
s |s=s0 = C1x˙s|s=s0 . Besides, since (xs0 , yt, zt)
forms a G-segment, therefore we have ∂
2
∂t2
G(xt0s , yt, zt)
∣∣∣
(s,t)=(s0,t0)
= ∂
2
∂t2
G(xs, yt, zt)
∣∣∣
(s,t)=(s0,t0)
= 0 and
∂2
∂t2
Gx(x
t0
s , yt, zt)
∣∣∣
(s,t)=(s0,t0)
= ∂
2
∂t2
Gx(xs, yt, zt)
∣∣∣
(s,t)=(s0,t0)
= 0.
From the above inequality and C1 > 0, one has
∂2
∂s2
(
1
Gz(xs,yt,zt)
∂2
∂t2
G(xs, yt, zt)
)∣∣∣
(s,t)=(s0,t0)
< 0, when-
ever x˙s|s=s0 and (y˙t, z˙t)|t=t0 are nonzero. Since this inequality holds for each fixed t0 ∈ [0, 1], the strict
version of (iii) is proved. 
Corollary A.3. Assuming (G0)-(G2), (G4)-(G8) and G ∈ C4(cl(X×Y ×Z)), then (G3) is equivalent
to the following statement: For any given curve xs ∈ X connecting x0 and x1, and any curve (yt, zt) ∈
cl(Y × Z) connecting (y0, z0) and (y1, z1), we have
(A.3)
∂2
∂s2
(
1
Gz(xs, yt, zt)
∂2
∂t2
G(xs, yt, zt)
)∣∣∣∣∣
(s,t)=(s0,t0)
≤ 0,
whenever either of the two curves t ∈ [0, 1] 7−→ (Gx, G)(xs0 , yt, zt) and s ∈ [0, 1] 7−→
Gy
Gz
(xs, yt0 , zt0)
forms an affinely parametrized line segment.
Appendix B. Concavity of principal’s objective when her utility does not depend
directly on agents’ private types: A sharper, more local result
In this section, we reveal a necessary and sufficient condition for the concavity of principal’s max-
imization problem, not only for the specific example as above, but for many other private-value
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circumstances, where principal’s utility only directly depends on the products sold and their selling
prices, but not the buyer’s type.
Proposition B.1 (Concavity of principal’s objective when her payoff is independent of agents’ types).
Suppose G ∈ C3(cl(X × Y × Z)) satisfies (G0)-(G6), pi ∈ C2(cl(Y × Z)), and assume there exists a
set J ⊂ cl(X) such that for each y¯ ∈ Y × Z, 0 ∈ (piy¯ + Gy¯)(cl(J), y¯). Then the following statements
are equivalent:
(i) local G¯
∗
-concavity of pi: i.e. piy¯y¯(y¯)+Gy¯y¯(x, y¯) is non-positive definite whenever (x, y¯) ∈ cl(J)×
Y × Z satisfies piy¯(y¯) +Gy¯(x, y¯) = 0;
(ii) Π is concave on U for all µ≪ Lm.
Remark B.2. The sufficient condition, i.e., existence of J ⊂ cl(X)(, such that for each y¯ ∈ Y × Z,
0 ∈ (piy¯ + Gy¯)(cl(J), y¯)), make the statement more general than taking some specific subset of cl(X)
instead. In particular, if J = cl(X), this condition is equivalent to: for each y¯ ∈ Y × Z, there exists
x ∈ cl(X), such that (piy¯+Gy¯)(x, y¯) = 0. One of its economic interpretations is that for each product-
price type, there exists a customer type, such that his marginal disutility, the gradient with respect to
product type (e.g., quality, quantity, etc.) and price type, coincides with the marginal utility of the
monopolist.
Proof of Proposition B.1. (i) ⇒ (ii). Similar to the proof of Corollary 4.10, we only need to show
non-positive definiteness of (pik¯j¯ − pil¯G¯
i¯,l¯G¯i¯,k¯j¯), i.e., for any x¯ = (x, x0) ∈ X × X0, y¯ ∈ Y × Z and
ξ ∈ Rn+1,
(
pik¯j¯(y¯)− pil¯(y¯)G¯
i¯,l¯(x¯, y¯)G¯i¯,k¯j¯(x¯, y¯)
)
ξk¯ξj¯ ≤ 0.
For any fixed x¯ = (x, x0) ∈ X × X0, y¯ ∈ Y × Z, ξ ∈ R
n+1, there exist δ > 0 and a curve
t ∈ (−δ, δ) 7−→ y¯t ∈ Y × Z, such that y¯t|t=0 = y¯, ˙¯yt|t=0 = ξ and
d2
dt2
G¯i¯,(x¯, y¯t) = 0. Thus,
(B.1) 0 =
d2
dt2
∣∣∣∣
t=0
G¯i¯,(x¯, y¯t) = G¯i¯,k¯j¯(x¯, y¯)ξ
k¯ξj¯ + G¯i¯,k¯(x¯, y¯) · (¨¯yt)
k¯
∣∣
t=0
For this y¯, since 0 ∈ (piy¯ + Gy¯)(cl(J), y¯), there exists x
∗ ∈ cl(J), such that (piy¯ + Gy¯)(x
∗, y¯) = 0. By
property (i), one has (piy¯y¯(y¯) + Gy¯y¯(x
∗, y¯))ξk¯ξj¯ ≤ 0. Let x¯∗ = (x∗,−1), then pil¯(y¯) = G¯,l¯(x¯
∗, y¯) and
pik¯j¯(y¯)ξ
k¯ξj¯ ≤ G¯,k¯j¯(x¯
∗, y¯)ξk¯ξj¯ , for each l¯ = 1, 2, ..., n + 1. Thus, combining (B.1) and (G3), we have(
pik¯j¯(y¯)− pil¯(y¯)G¯
i¯,l¯(x¯, y¯)G¯i¯,k¯j¯(x¯, y¯)
)
ξk¯ξj¯
≤
(
G¯,k¯j¯(x¯
∗, y¯)− G¯,l¯(x¯
∗, y¯)G¯i¯,l¯(x¯, y¯)G¯i¯,k¯j¯(x¯, y¯)
)
ξk¯ξj¯
= G¯,k¯j¯(x¯
∗, y¯)ξk¯ξj¯ + G¯,l¯(x¯
∗, y¯) · (¨¯yt)
l¯
∣∣
t=0
=
d2
dt2
∣∣∣∣
t=0
G¯(x¯∗, y¯t)
= −
d2
dt2
∣∣∣∣
t=0
G(x∗, y¯t)
≤ 0.
(B.2)
(ii) ⇒ (i). For any (x, y¯) ∈ cl(J) × Y × Z, satisfying piy¯(y¯) + Gy¯(x, y¯) = 0, we would like to show
(pik¯j¯(y¯) + G,k¯j¯(x, y¯))ξ
k¯ξj¯ ≤ 0, for any ξ ∈ Rn+1. Let x¯ = (x,−1), there exist δ > 0 and a curve
t ∈ (−δ, δ) 7−→ y¯t ∈ Y × Z, such that y¯t|t=0 = y¯, ˙¯yt|t=0 = ξ and
d2
dt2
G¯i¯,(x¯, y¯t) = 0. Thus, equation
(B.1) holds.
Since Π is concave, by Theorem 4.2 and Lemma 4.8 as well as equation (B.1), we have
0 ≥
(
pik¯j¯(y¯)− pil¯(y¯)G¯
i¯,l¯(x¯, y¯)G¯i¯,k¯j¯(x¯, y¯)
)
ξk¯ξj¯
24
=
(
pik¯j¯(y¯)− G¯,k¯j¯(x¯, y¯) + G¯,k¯j¯(x¯, y¯)− G¯,l¯(x¯, y¯)G¯
i¯,l¯(x¯, y¯)G¯i¯,k¯j¯(x¯, y¯)
)
ξk¯ξj¯
=
(
pik¯j¯(y¯)− G¯,k¯j¯(x¯, y¯)
)
ξk¯ξj¯ +
d2
dt2
∣∣∣∣
t=0
G¯(x¯, y¯t)
=
(
pik¯j¯(y¯)− G¯,k¯j¯(x¯, y¯)
)
ξk¯ξj¯
=(pik¯j¯(y¯) +G,k¯j¯(x, y¯))ξ
k¯ξj¯,
which completes the proof. 
The following remark provides an equivalent condition for uniformly concavity of principal’s maxi-
mization problem. Its proof is very similar to that of the above proposition.
Remark B.3. In addition to the hypotheses of Proposition B.1, when z¯ = +∞ assume the homeo-
morphisms of (G1) are uniformly bi-Lipschitz. Then the following statements are equivalent:
(i) piy¯y¯(y¯) +Gy¯y¯(x, y¯) is uniformly negative definite for all (x, y¯) ∈ cl(J)× Y ×Z such that piy¯(y¯) +
Gy¯(x, y¯) = 0;
(ii) Π is uniformly concave on U ⊂W 1,2(X, dµ), uniformly for all µ≪ Lm.
When m = n, G(x, y, z) = b(x, y) − z ∈ C3(cl(X × Y × Z)) satisfies (G0)-(G8), and pi(y, z) = z −
a(y) ∈ C2(cl(Y ×Z)), then Corollary 4.10 shows b∗-convexity of a is a sufficient condition for concavity
of Π for all µ≪ Lm. One may wonder under what hypotheses it would become a necessary condition
as well. From Theorem A.1 in [16], under the same assumptions as above, the manufacturing cost a
is b∗-convex if and only if it satisfies the following local b∗-convexity hypothesis: D2a(y) ≥ D2yyb(x, y)
whenever Da(y) = Dyb(x, y). Combined with Proposition B.1, we have the following corollary.
Corollary B.4. Adopting the terminology of [FKM11], i.e. (B0)-(B4), G(x, y, z) = b(x, y) − z ∈
C3(cl(X × Y × Z) and pi(x, y, z) = z − a(y) ∈ C2(cl(Y × Z), then a(y) is b∗-convex if and only if Π
is concave on U and for every y ∈ Y , there exists x ∈ cl(X) such that Da(y) = Dyb(x, y).
Proof. Assume a is b∗-convex, by definition, there exists a function a∗ : cl(X) → R, such that for
any y ∈ Y , a(y) = maxx∈cl(X) b(x, y) − a
∗(x). Therefore, for any y0 ∈ Y , there exists x0 ∈ cl(X),
such that a(y) ≥ b(x0, y) − a
∗(x0) for all y ∈ Y , with equality holds at y = y0. This implies,
Da(y0) = Dyb(x0, y0). Taking J = cl(X) and applying Proposition B.1, we have concavity of Π, since
local b∗-convexity of a is automatically satisfied by a b∗-convex function a.
On the other hand, assuming Π is concave on U and for every y ∈ Y , there exists x ∈ cl(X) such
that Da(y) = Dyb(x, y), Proposition B.1 implies local b
∗-convexity of a. Together with Theorem A.1
in [16], we know a is b∗-convex. 
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